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INTRODUCTION
Virginia v. Black' represents a complete reversal in the Court's approach to
the constitutionality of anti-cross-burning statutes. In R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,2
a unanimous Supreme Court held that St. Paul's ordinance regulating cross
burnings violated the First Amendment.3 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
explained that the purpose of the ordinance was not to target the supposed harm
caused by cross burnings, conduct which he characterized as "obnoxious" and
even "reprehensible," 4 but to suppress the politically unpopular message of
white supremacy.5 For Justice Scalia and the R.A.Y majority, the ordinance
represented an exercise in political correctness that was incompatible with the
First Amendment.6
In Virginia v. Black, slightly more than a decade later and in striking
departure from R.A. V, a divided Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute that
singled out cross burnings for regulation. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
Court in Black displayed a sensitivity to the harm caused by cross burning that
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1. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
2. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
3. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. Justice White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment that
was joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor in its entirety, and by Justice Stevens except as to Part
I.A. Justice Blackmun filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Stevens also filed a
separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Part I of which was joined by Justices White and
Blackmun.
4. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 393, 396.
5. Id. at 392.
6. See Jeremy J. Ofseyer, Speech or Opinion? Two Objects of First Amendment Immunity, 2002
UTAH L. REv. 843, 921-22 ("[l]n R.A.V., the Court seemed to fear that the lightning rod issue of hate
speech had resulted in local bans, which misused the traditional fighting words doctrine to enforce
prevailing standards of political correctness.").
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is conspicuously absent in Justice Scalia's opinion in R.A.V. 7 Justice O'Connor
devoted an entire section of her opinion to reviewing the historical meaning of
cross burnings in the United States.8 She summed up this historical review by
remarking that "while a burning cross does not inevitably convey a message of
intimidation, often the cross burner intends that the recipients of the message
fear for their lives. And when a cross burning is used to intimidate, few if any
messages are more powerful."9
As a consequence of the Black Court's newfound historical understanding of
the social meaning of cross burnings, its doctrinal posture vis-a-vis cross-
burning statutes differs dramatically from that of the Court in R.A. V In Black,
Justice O'Connor explained that in light of the historical meaning of cross
burning, the practice can be proscribed in a manner consistent with the First
Amendment.10 This doctrinal characterization of cross burning cannot be squared
with Justice Scalia's opinion in R.A.Y In R.A.Y, Justice Scalia's view of the
putative harm caused by cross burning led him to conclude, "St. Paul has
sufficient means at its disposal to prevent [cross burnings] without adding the
First Amendment to the fire.""' Thus, while the majority in R.A.Y indulged in
the obligatory acknowledgment that cross burnings cause some harm, its grudg-
ing acknowledgment did not affect its doctrinal analysis.
Remarkably, though the Black Court purported to follow R.A.Y, it seemed to
have accepted wholesale, at least implicitly, a central premise of statutes
prohibiting cross burning: that cross burning is more pernicious than other types
of speech-related harms and hence that statutes banning the practice deserve
greater solicitude under the First Amendment."2 This is a proposition that a
majority of the Court found insupportable and rejected completely in R.A.V13
Thus, following R.A.Y, one could have reasonably concluded that statutes
prohibiting cross burnings, even if narrowly tailored, are unconstitutional."4 In
comparison, the various opinions in Black support the conclusion that none of
7. See infra text accompanying notes 376-378.
8. Black, 538 U.S. at 352-57.
9. Id. at 357.
10. Id. at 359-60.
11. R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 396; see also id. at 392.
12. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106
HARv. L. REV. 124, 125-26 (1992).
13. See id.
14. See RA.Y, 505 U.S. at 402 (White, J., concuffing) (noting that the majority's approach
"necessarily signals that expressions of violence, such as the message of intimidation and racial hatred
conveyed by burning a cross on someone's lawn, are of sufficient value to outweigh the social interest
in order and morality that has traditionally placed such fighting words outside the First Amendmenf');
see also id. at 403-04 ("Under the majority's view, a narrowly drawn, content-based ordinance could
never pass constitutional muster if the object of that legislation could be accomplished by banning a
wider category of speech.").
In the wake of RA.Y, many state courts struck down statutes prohibiting cross burning as inconsis-
tent with the First Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753 (Md. 1993); State v. Vawter,
642 A.2d 349 (N.J. 1994); State v. Ramsey, 430 S.E.2d 511 (S.C. 1993); State v. Talley, 858 P2d 217
(Wash. 1993).
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the current Justices would strike down a narrowly drawn cross-burning stat-
ute.15
Furthermore, while the opponents of cross-burning statutes in R.A. V were, as
expected, the most conservative Justices on the Court-including Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-such is not the case in
Black. In -Black, all of the Court's recognized conservatives, with the exception
of Justice Kennedy, indicate a willingness to uphold a narrbwly drawn cross-
burning statute. In fact, of the Justices who were in the majority in R.A. V, all of
whom are on the current Court, only Justices Kennedy and Souter come close to
maintaining the same analytical posture toward cross-burning statutes in Black
as they did in R.A. V Thus, a majority of the Court's conservatives have adopted
the position on hate speech typically identified with liberals.' 6
Most notably, and in a delectable and ironic twist, in Black, the Court's
conservatives essentially accepted the intellectual framework and the mode of
analysis suggested previously by the critical race theorists.' 7 Indeed, the Justice
in Black whose view most closely resembles that of the critical race theorists is
none other than Justice Thomas.' 8 This is 'a posture against which the Court's
conservatives reacted vigorously in R.A. V' 9
The Court's opinion in Black thus raises a number of extremely interesting
questions. First, what accounts for the Court's decision to retreat from R.A. V's
absolutist approach? Relatedly, what prompted Justice Scalia, who authored the
Court's opinion in R.A.V, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrho signed on to that
opinion, apparently to change their minds in Black? In this Article I highlight
the crucial role that Justice Thomas played in Black and demonstrate how his
perspective is critical to the outcome of the case. I rely upon the concept of
epistemic authority to explain Justice Thomas's influence in Black,20 and argue
that Justice Thomas understood the harm caused by cross burnings from his
unique vantage point as the only African-American Justice on the Court. As a
consequence, Justice Thomas commanded the epistemic deference of his col-
leagues.
Second, Black provides us with an opportunity to revisit R.A.V and to
reexamine its meaning both prior to the Court's decision in Black and now in
15. Note that Justice Souter's dissent does not appear to disagree with the majority's core conclusion
that cross-burning statutes are not facially invalid. Justice Souter regards this conclusion as a "more
flexible" and "pragmatic" modification of R.A.V Black, 538 U.S. at 382, (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). While purporting to "reserve judgment on that doctrinal development," Justice
Souter does not maintain that it is a doctrinal development that he finds unfavorable. Id.
16. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 103-04
(1992).
17. ' See infra text accompanying notes 367-395.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 367-395.
19. See R.A.Y, 505 U.S. at 392-94; Cedric Merlin Powell, The Mythological Marketplace of Ideas:
R.A.V., Mitchell, and Beyond, 12 HARv. BLAcKLETTBR L.J. 1, 18-20 (1995).
20. Epistemic authority is authority based upon superior knowledge. I explain the concept and its
application to the case infra text accompanying notes 261-272.
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light of Black. Undoubtedly, Black has modified R.A. V, which was once thought
to be an important and permanent fixture in the Court's First Amendment
firmament. 21
Third, while the Court presumed that its decision in Black is consistent with
R.A. V, in view of the Court's analysis in Black one must question whether the
two decisions are reconcilable. One cannot reconcile these cases on the ground
that the ordinance in R.A. V is different from the Virginia statute in Black
because Virginia's cross-burning statute in Black is in material respects similar
to St. Paul's ordinance in R.A. V22 In fact, one can apply equally Justice Scalia's
reasoning in R.A.Y to strike down the Virginia statute at issue in Black or
Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Black to uphold St. Paul's ordinance in R.A. V2 3
Further, these cases cannot be explained on the ground that the First Amend-
ment landscape has changed such that the Court possesses new doctrinal tools
for understanding the relationship between cross burning and the First Amend-
ment in Black that did not exist in R.A. V
Part I of this Article examines the Court's decision in Black. Part 11 reviews
the Court's decision in R.A.V Part Im explores the meaning of R.A.V Part IV
demonstrates the role that Justice Thomas played in bringing about the result in
Black. Part IV also explains how Black represents at least a partial triumph for
critical race theorists and the doctrinal approach to regulating cross burning that
they have advocated. Part V maintains that Black cannot be squared with R.A. V
I. BLAcK
A. THE FACTS
On August 22, 1998, Barry Black planned and led a Ku Klux Klan rally in
Carroll County, Virginia.24 The rally was held on private property, with the
owner's permission, near a state highway. 25 Approximately thirty people at-
tended the gathering, at which the expected paeans to white supremacist ideals
21. See, e.g., EDWARD J. CLEARY, BEYOND THE BURNING CROSS: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
LANDMARK RA.VY CASE (1994); Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of
Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Values-A Critical Analysis of "Neutrality Theory" and Charitable
Choice, 13 NOTRE DAmE J.L. ETHcs & PUB. POL'Y 243, 269 n.54 (1999) (referring to R.A.V as an
"important" First Amendment case); Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content
Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 650 (2002)
(listing R.A.V among "importanf' recent decisions); Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, The Importance of
Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TuLsA L.J. 15, 40
(1998) (describing R.A.V. as "another of the [Rehnquist's Court's] most important decisions"); Robert
G. Schwemm & Rigel C. Oliveri, A New Look at Sexual Harassment under the Fair Housing Act: The
Forgotten Role of § 3604(c), 2002 Wis. L. REV. 771, 826-27 (2002) (stating that R.A.V. is the "most
importanf' of cases strilcing down hate speech regulation).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 232-34.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 235-48.
24. Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 741 (Va. 2001).
25. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 348 (2003).
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were expressed and reaffirmed. 26 Toward the end of the rally, the participants
consummated the experience by erecting and igniting a fairly large cross,
approximately twenty-five to thirty feet tall.27
Black was indicted and convicted of violating Virginia's cross-burning stat-
ute.28 The statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating
any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the
property of another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall
violate any provision of this section shall be guilty of a . .. felony.
Any burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate a person or group of persons.29
At Black's trial, the jury was instructed that "the burning of a cross by itself is
sufficient evidence ftom which you may infer the required intent." 30
Richard Elliott and Jonathan O'Mara were also prosecuted under Virginia's
cross burning statute after they attempted to burn a cross in the yard of Elliott's
neighbor James Jubilee.31 Jubilee, who is African-American, had recently moved
to the neighborhood and had apparently complained to Elliott's mother regard-
ing the sound of firearms emanating from the Elliott's backyard.32 As a retalia-
tory gesture, Elliott and O'Mara built a "crude wooden cross" and set it ablaze
in Jubilee's yard.33 Jubilee later discovered the partially burned cross and
notified the police.34 Elliott and O'Mara were charged with attempted cross
burning.35 O'Mara entered a guilty plea to charges of attempted cross burning
and conspiracy to commit a felony but reserved the right to challenge the
36
constitutionality of the statute. A jury convicted Elliott on the charge of
attempted cross burning.37 Elliott's jury did not receive any instructions on the
prima facie element of the statute.38
The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the convictions,39 and the defen-
dants appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.40 That court found the statute
unconstitutional on its face because it discriminated on the basis of content and
26. Id.
27. Black, 553 S.E.2d at 741.
28. Id.
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (West 2001).
30. Black, 538 U.S. at 349.
31. O'Mara v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 175, 177 (Va 2000).
32. Black, 553 S.E.2d at 740.
33. Id.
34. O'Mara, 535 S.E.2d at 177.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 351 (2003).
39. O'Mara, 535 S.E.2d at 181.
40. See Black, 553 S.E.2d at 741.
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the speaker's viewpoint, which is impermissible per R.A.V 41 The court also
concluded that the prima facie evidence portion of the statute is unconstitu-
tional, on overbreadth grounds, because the threat of arrest and prosecution
would chill protected expression.42
B. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A fractured Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part. In a striking
departure from R.A. V., however, the Court held that though the statute in
question was unconstitutional because of the prima facie intent provision,
Virginia could in principle prohibit cross burning without violating the First
Amendment.43 Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion for the Court and
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Breyer.
Justice O'Connor first reviewed the history of cross burnings in the United
States and reached the conclusion that "cross burning is often intimidating,
intended to create a pervasive fear in victims that they are a target of vio-
lence."44 Justice O'Connor then explained that while content-based distinctions
are generally disfavored under the First Amendment, the state may regulate
speech on the basis of its content if the state is regulating particular categories
of speech.45 These categories include fighting words,46 incitement,4 7 and true
threats. 48 The Court reasoned that burning a cross with the intent to intimidate
"is a type of true threat where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of
persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death."49
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the State should have proscribed all
intimidating messages. Relying upon the Court's earlier pronouncement in
R.A. V, Justice O'Connor's opinion noted that Virginia could, consistently with
the First Amendment, prohibit cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate
because Virginia "may choose to regulate [the] subset of intimidating messages"
that is "most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm."50
C. PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE COMPONENT
Justice O'Connor, however, was less favorably disposed toward the prima
facie provision of the statute. In a part of her opinion, joined only by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and Breyer, without Justice Scalia, she
41. See id. at 746.
42. Id.
43. Black, 583 U.S. at 363.
44. Id. at 360.
45. See id. at 358-359.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 359.
49. Id. at 359-360. Justice O'Connor defined a true threat as "statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals." Id.
50. Id. at 363.
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concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court was correct in reversing the convic-
tion of Barry Black because the prima facie element of the statute in conjunc-
tion with the jury instruction rendered the statute impernissibly overbroad.5 '
Justice O'Connor argued that the prima facie provision failed to distinguish
among the multitudinous messages potentially communicated by cross burn-
ing.52 She remarked that even though the act of burning a cross is often
committed as a method of intimidation, it is not invariably so. "[S]ometimes the
cross burning is a statement of ideology, a symbol of group solidarity."53 At
other times, a burning cross conveys neither ideology, nor solidarity, nor
intimidation, and its meaning must be derived from its context. For example,
crosses were burned "in movies such as Mississippi Burning, and in plays such
as the stage adaptation of Sir Walter Scott's The Lady of the Lake."54 The prima
facie element of the statute "ignore[d] all of the contextual factors that are
necessary to decide whether a particular cross burning is intended to intimidate.
The First Amendment does not permit such a shortcut."55
D. JUSTICE SOUTER 'S OPINION
Justice Souter wrote an opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg,
dissenting from the Court's decision in part and concurring in part.56 Justice
Souter's principal objection to Virginia's cross-burning statute was that the
prima facie evidence portion of the statute was indicative of the State's attempt
to stifle unwanted speech.57 Justice Souter reasoned that the "primary effect" of
the evidence provision "is to skew jury deliberations toward conviction in cases
where the evidence of intent to intimidate is relatively weak and arguably
consistent with a solely ideological reason for burning."5 8 Thus, in close cases,
"when the evidence of circumstances fails to point with any clarity either to the
criminal intent or to the permissible one," the provision encourages the jury to
resolve the doubt in favor of the State.59 Consequently, the provision made it
more likely that protected speech would be criminalized and legitimate speech
suppressed.6 0
Perhaps most objectionable to Justice Souter was the fact that the prima facie
provision was demonstrably unnecessary to achieve the State's purpose of
banning intimidating statements. As he noted, it "is difficult to conceive of an
51. Id. at 365.
52. Id.
53. Id. at366.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 367.
56. Id. at 380-87 (Souter, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
57. Id. at 386.
58. Id. at 387.
59. Id. at 386 (stating that "the provision will have the practical effect of tilting the jury's thinking in
favor of the prosecution").
60. Id. ('The provision will thus tend to draw nonthreatening ideological expression within the
ambit of the prohibition of intimidating expression.").
5812005]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
intimidation case that could be easier to prove than one with cross burning,
assuming any circumstances suggesting intimidation are present."61 If the provi-
sion was superfluous to the State's legitimate aims, Justice Souter reasoned, the
provision's only purpose must have been to communicate to the jury the State's
dislike for certain messages. 62 These messages, such as white supremacy and
similar ideologies, are "doubtfully threatening though certainly distasteful," but
nonetheless protected by the First Amendment.63 Hence, the provision was
suspect because it made it more likely than not that protected speech would get
criminalized. This was unconstitutional because it was indicative of the State's
intent to suppress unpopular, though protected, speech.64
II. R.A.V.
A. THE FACTS
The facts of R.A. V are in some respects quite similar to those of Black. In
R.A.YV, several teenagers "assembled a crudely made cross" and "burned the
cross inside the fenced yard" of an African-American family, neighbors of one
of the teens.65 The city charged R.A.V. with violating St. Paul's anti-cross-
burning ordinance. 66 The ordinance provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.67
The district court concluded that the statute was overbroad and dismissed the
charge.
The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed. 69 The court interpreted the ordi-
nance "so as to reach only those expressions of hatred and resorts to bias-
motivated personal abuse that the first amendment does not protect," 70 and
limited the application of the ordinance to fighting words that aroused anger,
alarm or resentment on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender. 7 ' The
61. Id. at 386-87.
62. Id. at 387.
63. Id. at 386.
64. Id.
65. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379 (1992).
66. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507,508 (Minn. 1991), rev'd sub nom. R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
67. ST. PAUL, MmN., LEGis. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
68. Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 508.
69. Id. at 509.
70. Id. at Sll.
71. Id. at 509-10.
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court also reasoned that the ordinance was constitutional "to the extent it
prohibits conduct that is 'directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action."'72 So construed, the court
upheld the ordinance.
B. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Though the Justices unanimously
agreed that the ordinance violated the First Amendment, they differed strongly
as to the reasoning. Justice Scalia authored the opinion of the Court and was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas.
Justice Scalia concluded that even if one accepts the limitation on the ordinance
imposed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the ordinance is still facially uncon-
stitutional because it regulates speech on the basis of its content.73
Justice Scalia's analysis began with the proposition that; as a general matter,
content-based distinctions are presumptively unconstitutional.74 The govern-
ment cannot regulate speech or symbolic speech if the regulation is aimed at the
presumed content of that speech.75 While the presumption in favor of the
unconstitutionality of content-based distinctions is strong, it is not absolute. The
state may engage in content-based distinctions "in a few limited" categories,
including defamation, obscenity, and fighting words.76 Though these categories
are of marginal importance to the First Amendment's core interests and their
contribution as speech is not always important, they are nevertheless speech.77
Consequently, even where the state is regulating proscribable categories, the
First Amendment applies still, and content-based restrictions will be permissible
only in a few narrow instances. 78
C. PERMISSIBLE CONTENT DISCRIMINATION
The Court delineated four such limifed instances where content-based regula-
tions are permissible. First, the state may engage in content discrimination
within a regulable category so long as "the basis for the content discrimination
consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is
proscribable." 79 I will term this the primary effects exception: content-based
72. Id. at 510 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969)).
73. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381 ("Assuming, arguendo, that all of the expression reached by the
ordinance is proscribable under the 'fighting words' doctrine, we nonetheless conclude that the
ordinance is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis
of the subjects the speech addresses.").
74. Id. at 382; see also Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.").
75. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 382.
76. Id. at 382-83.
77. Id. at 384-85.
78. Id. at 387.
79. Id. at388.
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regulations within a proscribable category are permissible if the state is regulat-
ing the speech on the basis of its primary effects.
Justice Scalia provided three examples to illustrate the contours of the
primary effects exception. Consider obscenity, which is a regulable category.
The state may draw lines within that category-discriminating for example
among the least obscene, obscene and most obscene speech-if the state is
concerned about the effects of truly obscene speech.80 The state may not,
however, prohibit "only that obscenity which includes offensive political mes-
sages."'81 Similarly, the state may specifically prohibit threats of violence against
the President "since the reasons why threats of violence are outside the First
Amendment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disrup-
tion that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence
will occur) have special force when applied to the person of the President."82 In
contrast, the state cannot prohibit "only those threats against the President that
mention his policy on aid to inner cities" without violating the First Amendment
because the President's policies on inner cities is unrelated to the reason why
threats of violence against the President are proscribable.83 Lastly, the state may
regulate commercial speech, for example price discrimination, "because the risk
of fraud (one of the characteristics of commercial speech that justifies depriving
it of full First Amendment protection) is in its view greater there." 84 But the
government cannot "prohibit only that commercial advertising that depicts men
in a demeaning fashion." 85
Second, the state may also engage in content discrimination within a regu-
lable category where the state is concerned about the "secondary effects" of the
speech.86 So the state may permissibly prohibit adult motion picture theaters
within 1,000 feet of a school if the purpose of the regulation is to limit crime
and to maintain surrounding property values. 87
Third, the R.A. V Court also noted an incidental effects exception. If the
state's regulation is aimed at the individual's conduct, the regulation is not
subject to heightened scrutiny simply because a "particular content-based subcat-
egory of a proscribable class of speech" is "swept up incidentally within the
reach" of the legislation.8 8 The state may prohibit "sexually derogatory 'fighting
words"' in a statute aimed at eliminating sexual discrimination in employ-
ment.89 Or the state may provide greater criminal sanctions for bias-motivated
80. Id.
81. Id. at 388.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 388-89 (internal citation omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id. at389.
87. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
88. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 389.
89. Id.
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crimes.90
Finally, the state may engage in content discrimination provided that "the
nature of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility
that official suppression of ideas is afoot."9 ' Hence, Justice Scalia explained,
"We cannot think of any First Amendment interest that would stand in the way
of a State's prohibiting only those obscene motion pictures with blue-eyed
actresses."92
D. ANALYSIS OF THE ORDINANCE
Turning to St. Paul's ordinance, the Court concluded that it violated the First
Amendment for two reasons. First, the ordinance was impermissibly content-
based. It drew a line across various content categories and located on one side
of the line the categories of race, religion, and gender, while all other categories
lay on the other side of the line.93
Second, the ordinance discriminated on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint.
The St. Paul ordinance prohibited those speakers who disagreed with the city's
message of racial, gender, and religious tolerance from using fighting words in
favor of their position. However, those individuals who support the city's
message of tolerance could use fighting words in favor of their position. Thus,
"[o]ne could up a sign saying, for example, that all "anti-Catholic bigots" are
misbegotten, but not that all "papists" are, for that would insult and provoke
violence 'on the basis of religion."'9 4 Justice Scalia concluded, "St. Paul has no
such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring
the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules." 95
Though the ordinance was content-based, it could have been saved if it could
fit under one of the exceptions to content-based regulations. The ordinance,
however, could not so be saved. The Court first noted that the ordinance could
not come within the ambit of the primary-effects exception because the city did
not select "an especially offensive mode of expression" such as "fighting words
90. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (holding that a Wisconsin statute that enhanced
sentence for crime against a victim intentionally selected because of race did not violate defendant's
First Amendment rights).
91. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 390.
92. Id. at 390.
93. Justice Scalia remarked:
Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless
they are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics. Those who wish to use "fighting
words" in connection with other ideas-to express hostility, for example, on the basis of
political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality-are not covered. The First Amend-
ment does not pernit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express
views on disfavored subjects.
Id. at 391.
94. Id. at 391-92.
95. Id. at 392.
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that communicate ideas in a threatening ... manner."96 Instead, the City sought
to ban "obnoxious" expressions-"fighting words of whatever manner that
communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance." 97 Because
St. Paul attempted to regulate speech directly, as opposed to regulating the
secondary effects of speech, or incidentally regulating speech by targeting
certain conduct, the ordinance could not be saved by any of the other bases
upon which the state may pernissibly engage in content-based regulations
within a proscribable category. 98
m. UNDERSTANDING R.A. V
R.A.V is admittedly a difficult case to understand. In R.A.Y, Justice Scalia
"reach[ed] out unnecessarily ... to condemn the government's motives, despite
the narrower available alternative of simply whittling down the excessive scope
of the punished speech."99 Additionally, in the process of resolving the case "on
a ground that require[d] serious departures from the teaching of prior cases,"l°°
the Court created a novel doctrinal framework that has been criticized by
many.101 R.A. V's opacity is due in part to the majority's failure to fully
explicate its concerns with St. Paul's ordinance. However, once one comes to
terms with the Court's underlying concern, R.A.V's meaning becomes much
more transparent. Section A examines Justice Scalia's doctrinal framework in
R.A.Y, and concludes that even though Justice Scalia's justification for his
framework is plausible, it is ultimately unsatisfying. Section B offers a different
justification than the Court provided in R.A.V for its doctrinal framework. I
justify the Court's doctrinal approach as underscoring the importance of state
justifications-the requirement that the state provide legitimate reasons for its
classifications-in First Amendment jurisprudence. Section C argues that R.A. V
reflects the majority's deep skepticism that the government is regulating cross
burning in order to address a legitimate harm. R.A. V represents a suspicion that
statutes targeting cross burnings are invariably aimed at enforcing a politically
correct viewpoint while concomitantly suppressing racist speech that the state
disapproves. Hence, R.A. V stands for the proposition that statutes targeting
cross burning are per se unconstitutional. This understanding of R.A.V best
explains Justice Scalia's decision to promulgate a novel doctrinal framework as
opposed to deciding the case on overbreadth grounds.
96. Id. at 393.
97. Id. at 393-94.
98. Id. at 394-95.
99. Sullivan, supra note 16, at 104.
10o. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,398 (1992) (White, J., concurring).
101. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DisSENT, INJUSTnCE, AND TE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 49-87 (1999)
(describing how the Court "bungled the First Amendment job" in R.A.V.); Erwin Chemerinsky, Content
Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court's Application,
74 S. CAL. L. REv. 49, 63-64 (2000) (characterizing the consequences of Scalia's approach as
"undesirable"); Heyman, supra note 21, at 714 (calling Scalia's approach "unwise").
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A. JUSTICE SCALIA'S SUPERFICIALLY PLAUSIBLE FRAMEWORK
Justice Scalia's opening move is the non-controversial assertion that content-
based laws are presumptively unconstitutional because the government may not
regulate speech on the basis of hostility or favoritism to the content of the
speech.'0 2 However, as most students of the First Amendment recognize, there
are many categories of speech that the government may regulate on the basis of
its content-for example, fighting words, obscenity, threats-without running
afoul of the First Amendment. 103 This fact, prior to R.A. V, gave rise to the view
that the scope of the First Amendment's protection did not extend to certain
categories of content-based regulations because expression falling within those
categories did not reflect the "values the First Amendment was designed to
protect."' 0 4
Justice Scalia conceded that the Court's precedents excluded certain areas of
speech from the purview of the First Amendment,' 0 5 but he attempted to
minimize that concession on the ground that the language used in those cases
"must be taken in context."' 06 The Court, he intimated, could not have meant
and did not mean what it appeared to say in those cases. 107 Instead, the Court
intended to communicate that certain areas of speech can be regulated because
of their content, not because they constitute non-speech.' 08 Thus, while the
government may regulate proscribable categories, it can only do so within the
shadow of the First Amendment. '09
Though the concurring Justices correctly noted that the majority's conclusion
was inconsistent with the Court's prior pronouncements on regulable categories
under the First Amendment,'10 the majority's insistence that regulable catego-
ries, such as fighting words, obscenity, and true threats, constitute speech is not
102. R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 382.
103. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343. 358 (2003) ("The protections afforded by the First Amend-
ment, however, are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the government may regulate certain
categories of expression consistent with the Constitution."); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are certain well-defined and narrowly linited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.").
104. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 399 (White, J., concurring).
105. See id. at 400 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union, 466 U.S 485,504 (1984); and Sable Communications of Calo, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 124 (1989)).
106. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 383.
107. See id. (stating that the Court's prior statements are not literally true).
108. Justice Scalia stated:
[TMhese areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment be regulated because of
their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)-not that they are
categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the
vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.
'Id. at 383-84.
109. Id. at 384.
'110. Id. at 398 (White, J., concurring) (noting that the Court's analysis "requires serious departures
from the teaching of prior cases").
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without merit."' These categories are both expressive and communicative. '2
The Court's prior declarations on the constitutional status of regulable catego-
ries were indeed intellectually sloppy, and Justice Scalia's claim that the govern-
ment cannot regulate speech on the basis of favoritism or hostility to the content
of the speech is thought by some to constitute a bedrock principle of the First
Amendment. 113
However, the R.A. V Court is less clear as to why regulating certain categories
is consistent with the First Amendment. Justice Scalia provided two distinctive
reasons for the subordinate status of regulable categories such as fighting
words." 4 The first part of the opinion justifies the categorical approach on the
theory that such categories may be regulated on the basis of their content:
[O]ur society, like other free but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions
upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are "of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.""115
Yet, this first explanation is inconsistent with the thrust of Justice Scalia's
opinion. After all, an important component of the majority's purpose in R.A. V is
establishing the proposition that proscribable categories cannot be regulated
simply because the state disagrees with the message. Moreover, the explanation
is particularly at odds with the majority's later assertion that it "is not true that
[regulable categories] have at most a 'de minimis' expressive content. . . or that
their content is in all respects 'worthless and undeserving of constitutional
111. Id. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that while the Court has in previous opinions
maintained that regulable categories are outside of the purview of the First Amendment, it has "quite
rightly" deviated from those categorical statements).
112. As Dean Kagan noted, "though courts often claim that fighting words and other unprotected
speech have no expressive content or function, these claims ought not to be taken at face value.....
Claims to the contrary serve as shorthand for a complex calculation that the harms of such speech
outweigh their contribution to the sphere of expression." Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose:
The Role of Governmental Motive in FirstAmendment, 63 U. Cm. L. REv. 413, 419 (1996).113. Steven D. Hincldey, Your Money or Your Speech: The Children's Internet Protection Act and
the Congressional Assault on the First Amendment in Public Libraries, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1025, 1074(2002) (referring to the "bedrock principle that the government may not place restrictions on expression
simply because it finds the ideas expressed to be offensive or disagreeable."); Geoffrey R. Stone,Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 196 (1983) (tracing the
rise of the distinction between content-based and content-neutral restrictions as a governing principle).In an oft-quoted declaration, for example, the Court announced in Police Department of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972), that "above all else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."Although this declaration has proved to be somewhat overstated, the Court has been remarkably true toits word, for except when low value speech is at issue, the Court has invalidated almost every
content-based restriction that it has considered in the past quarter-century. Stone, supra, at 196-97.114. See R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 383 (listing regulable categories). i
115. Id. at 383 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). Similarly, he
explained, "these areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of
their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)." Id.
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protection.' ''l16
Toward the end of the opinion, Justice Scalia offered a second rationale: "the
reason why [certain categories] are . .. excluded from the protection of the First
Amendment is not that their content communicates any particular idea, but that
their content embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary)
mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey."' 1 7 These
categories, such as "fighting words," are akin to a noisy sound truck.' 18 Like a
noisy sound truck, fighting words constitute a manner of speaking that can be
used to communicate an idea, but it is not a manner that necessarily has "a
claim upon the First Amendment."' 19
Even so, though fighting words (and other regulable categories) may be
similar to a noisy sound truck in terms of their communicative value, "the
government may not regulate their use based on hostility-or favoritism-
towards the underlying message expressed."' 20 On the strength of this proposi-
tion, Justice Scalia deduced the contentious precept that even where the
government is legislating within a regulable category, it cannot engage in
additional and discrete content-based distinctions.' 2 ' Strict scrutiny is appli-
cable to content-based regulations within proscribable categories. This proposi-
tion served as the necessary linchpin of the R.A.Y majority.
This move led Justice White to lament the majority's doctrinal framework,
which Justice White characterized as specious.'22 If the government can pro-
scribe an entire category of speech, it necessarily follows that it can proscribe a
subset of that category.123 By definition, "the content of the subset is ...
worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection."'12 4
The majority offered a response, though it failed to offer a reason to support
its holding that the First Amendment restricts the state's ability to engage in
content-based restrictions within proscribable categories.' 25 Instead, Justice
Scalia provided a series of quirky examples purportedly intended to illustrate
the truth of the principle. If the state were not prohibited from engaging in
content discrimination within proscribable categories, the Court would be power-
less to strike down a number of hypothetical state regulations that patently
violate the First Amendment. For example, the Court would have to uphold "an
ordinance prohibiting only those obscene works that contain criticism of the city
116. Id. at384-85.
117. Id.at 393.
118. Id. at386.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id, at 401 (White, J., concurring) ("It is inconsistent to hold that the government may proscribe
an entire category of speech because the content of that speech is evil, but that the government may not
treat a subset of that category differently without violating the First Amendment.").
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Justice Scalia failed to provide a single case to support the proposition.
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government or, indeed, that do not include endorsement of the city govern-
ment"126 on the ground that the city may regulate obscenity. The Court would
have to sanction a state law prohibiting "only that obscenity which includes
offensive political messages."127 The Court would also have to countenance a
federal law criminalizing "threats against the President that mention his policy
on aid to inner cities" on the ground that the federal government may legiti-
mately criminalize threats of violence against the President. 128 Since the Court
would not uphold those regulations, one must conclude that the state cannot
engage freely in content-based discriminations within proscribable categories
without implicating the First Amendment.
The Court's approach in R.A. V is not without its critics.129 Many commenta-
tors, including the concurring Justices, have condemned Justice Scalia's opinion
for fashioning a doctrine where none had existed, instead of deciding the case
on overbreadth grounds.' 30 For example, Justice White derisively referred to
R.A.V's principle as "the Court's new 'underbreadth' creation,"'31 and Justice
Stevens poked fun at the majority's doctrinal framework by categorizing it as
"something of an adventure in a doctrinal wonderland."'13 2
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE JUSTIFICATIONS
Despite the criticism, was Justice Scalia right? Does the fact that the Court
would not support any of his hypothetical regulations logically establish the
principle that states may not freely engage in content-based distinctions within
proscribable categories? As this Section shows, the essence of Justice Scalia's
doctrinal approach is on target, though his precise formulation and the reasons
that support his doctrinal framework may leave something to be desired.
Consider this proposition as an alternative explanation for the examples that
Justice Scalia provided: The government may not regulate speech without
sufficient justification. This alternative proposition also comes with a corollary:
Hostility toward speech is not a compelling justification under the First Amend-
ment.133 Concededly, this principle and its corollary are less profound and more
126. 505 U.S. at 384.
127. Id. at 388.
128. Id. at 388-89.
129. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence Im, Crossbuming and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination
Theory and the FirstAmendment, 37 VILL. L. REv. 787 (1992).
130. G. Sidney Buchanan, The Hate Speech Case: A Pyrrhic Victory for Freedom of Speech?, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 285, 309-10 (1992) (describing overbreadth as "the clear and preferred basis" for
decision).
131. R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 402 (White, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring).
133. The Court has maintained on numerous occasions that the state may not regulate speech if its
purpose is to suppress a viewpoint or to enforce its own orthodox viewpoint. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-30 (1995).
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pedestrian than the principle announced in R.A.V The alternative principle,
however, is more persuasive, obvious, and reasonable.' 34
Justice Scalia's examples demonstrate that justifications matter in First Amend-
ment doctrine.135 Put differently, the govermment does not violate the First
Amendment when it can offer a "legitimate, reasonable, and neutral justifica-
tion[]" for the regulation.'36 When government action infringes upon protected
speech, it must provide a satisfactory justification for the infringement. Where
the government's justifications are not sufficient, the Court will not uphold the
regulation at issue. Phrased in those terms, R.A. V's doctrinal approach does not
appear to be such a radical departure from modem First Amendment jurispru-
dence.
Police Departmnent of Chicago v. Mosley137 and Carey v. Brown138 are
analogous cases that help prove the point. In both cases, the plaintiffs chal-
lenged a residential picketing statute that prohibited residential picketing but
created an exception for labor picketing.' 39 In Mosley, the government justified
the distinction as necessary "for preventing disruption of the school."' 40 In
134. Professor Schauer has recently explained, "contrary to how the Court understood the issue in
R.A.V., it is sounder to think of the distinctions [made in R.A.V] in light of a First Amendment not that
protects speech, but instead that prohibits certain reasons for restricting it." Frederick Schauer,
Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 SuP. CT. REV.
197,207.
135. See generally, Kagan, supra note 113.
136. R.A.V, 505 U.S. 416 (Stevens, J., concurring).
137. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). For seven months before Chicago enacted an ordinance prohibiting
picketing within 150 feet of a school while the school is in session, Earl Mosley maintained a one-man
picket against a Chicago high school. Id. at 93. Mosley carried a sign stating that "Jones High School
practices black discrimination. Jones High School has a black quota." Id. The ordinance exempted from
its purview "'the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute."' Id. at 93-94. After the
ordinance became effective, Mosely filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of
the statute. In particular, Mosely complained that the provision exempting labor picketing from the
statute's general prohibition against picketing violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id.
at 94.
138. 447 U.S. 455 (1980). The defendants, who were protesting the City's refusal to bus students as
a means of integrating the City's public schools, had previously been arrested for violating the statute
after they picketed the home of Chicago's mayor. Id. at 457. They argued that the statute violated their
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id.
139. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 93-94; Brown, 447 U.S. at 457-59. The statute in Mosley stated in part:
A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly: (i) Pickets or demonstrates on a
public way within 150 feet of any primary or secondary school building while the school is in
session and one-half hour before the school is in session and one-half hour after the school
session has been concluded, provided, that this subsection does not prohibit the peaceful
picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92-93 (quoting CEIcAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE, ch. 193-1(i) (1968)). The statute in
Brown provided that:
It is unlawful to picket before or about the residence or dwelling of any person, except when
the residence or dwelling is used as a place of business. However, this Article ... does not
prohibit the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute ....
Brown, 447 U.S. at 457 (quoting ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, § 21.1-2 (1977)).
140. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99.
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Brown, the state argued that the statute was indispensable to safeguarding
residential tranquility. 14 ' In both cases the government argued that labor picket-
ing was less disruptive than non-labor picketing.'4 2
In both cases, the Court agreed that the government was regulating pursuant
to an important govermnental interest.' 43 The Court also noted that the speech
targeted by the statutes fell within a regulable category.'44 However, the statutes
were also content-based and thus required a justification.' 45
The Court concluded that the statutes were unconstitutional because the state
could not provide a legitimate or neutral justification for the content-based
discrimination.' 46 The Court maintained that the basis for the labor/non-labor
distinction was "improper content censorship."' 4 7 From the Court's perspective,
the exemption contained in the statutes reflected the government's impermis-
sible motive. 48 "[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people
whose views it finds acceptable, but deny the use to those wishing to express
less favored or more controversial views."1'49 Thus, the Court maintained,
"above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content."15 0
As Mosley and Brown demonstrate, the government's ability to permissibly
regulate a certain area of speech does not necessarily preclude an inquiry into
the government's motives and an evaluation of the government's justifications.
Because the statutes were both over- and underinclusive, the Court questioned
the state's proffered explanation.' 5 ' Since the state's explanation did not com-
port with the statutory scheme, speech suppression best explained the govern-
141. Brown, 447 U.S. at 454.
142. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100; Brown, 447 U.S. at 465.
143. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98, 100; Brown, 447 U.S. at 471.
144. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99 (noting that time, place, and manner restrictions, or other
regulations necessary to preserve public order, are legitimate); Brown, 447 U.S. at 470-71 (quoting
Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118 (1969) (Black, J. concurring) ("[N]o mandate in our Constitu-
tion leaves States and governmental units powerless to pass laws to protect the public from the kind of
boisterous and threatening conduct that disturbs the tranquility of spots selected by the people either for
homes... or for public and other buildings that require peace and quiet to carry out their functions, such
as courts, libraries, schools. and hospitals.")).
145. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95, 99; Brown, 447 U.S. at 460-61 ("On its face, the Act accords
preferential treatment to the expression of views on one particular subject; information about labor
disputes may be freely disseminated, but discussion of all other issues is restricted.").
146. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 102; Brown, 447 U.S. at 471.
147. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99; see also Brown, 447 U.S. at 462.
148. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
149. Id
150. Id. at 95.
151. Id. at 100 ("Although preventing school disruption is a city's legitimate concern, Chicago itself
has determined that peaceful labor picketing during school hours is not an undue interference with
school. Therefore, under the Equal Protection Clause, Chicago may not maintain that other picketing
disrupts the school unless that picketing is clearly more disruptive than the picketing Chicago already
permits."); Brown, 447 U.S. at 465 ("The apparent overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of the
statute's restriction would seem largely to undermine appellant's claim that the prohibition of all
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ment's true motive. 52
Returning to R.A. V's hypothetical speech restrictions, one can offer an
alternative reason to explain why such laws would be unconstitutional. A city
ordinance prohibiting obscene art that is critical of the city council is unconstitu-
tional not because the state may not engage in content-based discrimination
when it is regulating in a proscribable category-in this case obscenity-but
rather because the ordinance singles out obscene political speech, indicating
that the government's real motive is the regulation of political speech. In other
words, the government's proffered justification, that it is really interested in
regulating obscene speech, is belied by the government's singling out political
speech for regulation.
Similarly, a federal statute that criminalized only threats against the Presi-
dent's policy on an issue of national importance would violate the First Amend-
ment because it would regulate core political speech without sufficient
justification. Once again, singling out threatening political speech for regulation
illustrates the government's illicit motive: regulation of political speech. The
government would not be able to offer a sufficiently compelling or plausible
justification for the distinction. In the absence of a reasonable justification, one
must sensibly conclude that the government is not regulating speech because of
concern about obscenity or threats; rather, the government is using the proscrib-
able category as a pretext for regulating protected speech.'53
Perhaps more importantly, the principle that government may not regulate
speech without sufficient justification explains the majority's decision in R.A. V
better than the principle proclaimed by Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia's opinion is
least persuasive in its attempt to cabin the reach of his principle and distinguish
the facts of R.A. V from seemingly similar contexts. Justice Scalia addressed two
such contexts: threats against the President and "sexually derogatory 'fighting
words' ... [in] violation of Title VII's general prohibition against sexual
discrimination in employment practices.' 5 4
Justice Scalia explained that threats against the President fell within the
primary-effects exception because "the reasons why threats of violence are
outside the First Amendment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence,
from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur) have special force when applied to the person of
nonlabor picketing can be justified by reference to the State's interest in maintaining domestic
tranquility.").
152. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100-01; Brown, 447 U.S. at 465.
153. Schauer, suipra note 134, at 11 ("From this perspective what is wrong with the ... distinctions
is ... that they are based on reasons and distinctions-between viewpoints, most notably-that the
First Amendment simply cannot countenance, and that the distinctions that are ... [permissiblel are
acceptable because, by being based on distinctions that support the doctrinal structure itself, they reflect
reasons the First Amendment does not deem impermissible.").
154. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388-89 (1992) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000); 29
CFR § 1604.11 (1991)).
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the President."' 55 Additionally, as Justice Souter added in Black, "[d]ifferential
treatment of threats against the President ... selects nothing but special risks,
not special messages.' 5 6 If Justices Scalia and Souter are right, then statutes
prohibiting cross burning cannot be distinguished from statutes prohibiting
threats of violence against the President. As Justice Stevens remarked:
Precisely this same reasoning ... compels the conclusion that St. Paul's
ordinance is constitutional. Just as Congress may determine that threats
against the President entail more severe consequences than other threats, so
St. Paul's City Council may determine that threats based on the target's race,
religion, or gender cause more severe harm to both the target and to society
than other threats. This latter judgment-that harms caused by racial, reli-
gious, and gender-based invective are qualitatively different from that caused
by other fighting words-seems to me eminently reasonable and realistic.' 57
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that racial, ethnic, and religious minorities
are at greater risk of being targeted by cross burners than are racial, ethnic, and
religious majorities. Thus, outlawing cross burning would be justified on the
grounds that cross burning is uniquely directed against minorities.
Justice Scalia's attempt to distinguish Title VII hostile work environment
claims from cross burning claims under the First Amendment is similarly
unpersuasive. Under Justice Scalia's reasoning, Title VII passes muster under
the First Amendment, despite an explicit content-based distinction within a
regulable category, because the statute falls under the secondary-effects excep-
tion of R.A.V158 Justice Scalia argued that Title VII is not vulnerable to
constitutional attack under the First Amendment because the statute is directed
at conduct and not speech.' 59 Title VII admittedly impacts speech, but this
impact is pernissible because it is incidental to regulating conduct.' 60
One can easily advance an analogous argument with respect to cross burning
statutes. As a preliminary matter, note that "the overwhelming proportion of
hostile environment cases are ones in which words or pictures are a significant
part of the circumstances that create a hostile environment."'16 ' This empirical
reality belies the contention that sexual harassment claims are directed primarily
155. Id. at388.
156. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 384 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
157. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 424 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
158. Id. at 390 ("Where the government does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive
content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or
philosophy.").
159. Id. at 389. For a further and more expansive development of this point, see CATHARIm A.
MAcKuINON, ONLY WoRDs 45-68 (1993).
160. R.A.1V, 505 U.S. at 389.
161. Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECToNs IN SExuAL HARAssmENT
LAW 347, 352 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).
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at conduct and secondarily or incidentally towards speech.1 62 In contrast,
leaving aside the question of whether cross-burning statutes are directed at
constitutionally protected messages, those statutes undoubtedly regulate con-
duct: the act of cross burning. Thus, it is not clear why a statute that targets
sex-based "hate speech" in the workplace is directed at conduct but not speech,
whereas a statute targeting race-based "hate speech" is directed at speech but
not conduct. On the contrary, one would think that a statute that prohibits cross
burning comes closer to regulating conduct than a statute that regulates sexual
harassment in the workplace.
One can avoid these ad hoc distinctions by recognizing the importance of the
government's justification in R.A.Y Regardless of Justice Scalia's adamant
assertion in R.A.Y that a state may not engage in additional content-based
regulations within a prohibited category, the Court's fundamental objection to
the St. Paul ordinance was the belief that the government singled out cross
burning not because of the harm that cross burning caused-a legitimate
justification-but because the government disagreed with the message communi-
cated by cross burnings-an illegitimate justification. Justice Scalia reasoned
that the city's purpose in passing the ordinance was to "display[] the city
council's special hostility towards" white supremacist and bias-motivated hate
speech' 63 and to "communicate to minority groups that the 'group hatred'
aspect of such speech 'is not condoned by the majority."",164 The city's attempt
to manipulate the content of speech suggested a "realistic possibility that official
suppression of ideas is afoot."' 65 Thus, the R.A.V Court ultimately concluded
that the ordinance was unconstitutional because "the city is seeking to handicap
the expression of particular ideas," a goal that is intolerable under the First
Amendment.' 66 Message suppression is not a legitimate justification. In this
regard, R.A.Y must be understood as the Court's statement against political
correctness and hate speech legislation, which can be otherwise characterized as
state-enforced orthodoxy.
162. In fact, some scholars have seized upon this speech component to argue that statutes prohibiting
hostile work environment sexual harassment violate the First Amendment. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh,
What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEo. L.J. 627 (1997);
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791 (1992). My
point here is not that hostile work environment harassment claims are inconsistent with the First
Amendment. Rather, my point is that Justice Scalia's attempt to distinguish the First Amendment status
of those claims from the First Amendment status of cross burning claims is difficult to sustain. As
Professor Schauer explains, the, First Amendment status of sexual harassment claims cannot be
explained by First Amendment doctrine, as Justice Scalia attempted to do. To understand the constitu-
tional status of sexual harassment claims (presumably as well as cross burning claims), one "cannot
ignore the role of politics, culture, economics, and numerous other social forces in determining which
forms of word-based conduct inspire First Amendment rhetoric and standards and which do not."
Schauer, supra note 161, at 348.
163. R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 396.
164. Id. at 392 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 25, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)
(No. 90-7675)).
165. See id. at 390.
166. Id. at 394.
5952005]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
C. CROSS-BURNING STATUTES AND THE EPISTEMIC DILEMMA
R.A.Y must also be understood as the Court's attempt to constitutionalize its
distrust of the state. To best appreciate this point, consider that cross-burning
statutes present an interesting epistemic dilemma for First Amendment jurispru-
dence. The epistemic question for the Court is determining when and whether it
should believe the state's proffered explanation for promulgating a particular
regulation that raises First Amendment concerns.' 6 7 As the Black Court recog-
nized, a burning cross communicates at least two distinct, though not necessar-
ily unrelated, messages."' A burning cross may communicate a socio-political
racist message of white supremacy' 69 or a threat to an intended victim,' 70 or it
may do both.171 While the state cannot target cross burning because it disagrees
with the message of white supremacy that the burning cross may communi-
cate,'72 it can proscribe cross burnings if its purpose is to suppress the threat
communicated by cross burnings.173 Thus, courts are obliged to defer to the
state's justification where the state is regulating cross burning on a permissible
basis. At the same time, courts must be vigilant to guard against state-imposed
orthodoxy.
As an illustrative exercise, compare flag burning with cross burning. Flag
burning presents a straightforward case for judicial resolution because govern-
ment justifications of flag-burning statutes are not entitled to any epistemic
deference whatsoever. Courts do not believe that the state has greater knowl-
edge about the way the world works with respect to burning flags than dojudges. In fact, statutes regulating flag burning engender judicial skepticism.
Consider in this vein Texas v. Johnson.'74
In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that Texas infringed upon Gregory Lee
Johnson's First Amendment rights when it convicted him for violating a statute
prohibiting desecration of the flag.' 75 The Texas statute provided that a person
could not "deface, damage, or otherwise physically mistreat [a state or national
flag] in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons
167. For a fuller discussion of epistemic authority, see infra text accompanying notes 262-272.
168. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003); see also id. at 381 (Souter, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
169. The prototypical example here is the KKIK member who burns a cross on the lawn of a black
family.
170. Consider a hypothetical in which the cross burner and the intended victim are both African
Americans. In that scenario, the burning cross would signal an intent to harm, but not a message of
white supremacy. A black person who burned a cross on the lawn of another black person would not be
communicating a message of racial supremacy, but one of threat.
171. See Black, 538 U.S. at 354-56,363.
172. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992); see also id. at 386 (noting that "the
power to proscribe [speech] on the basis of one content element (e.g., obscenity) does not entail the
power to proscribe it on the basis of other content elements").
173. See id. at 386.
174. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
175. See id. at 399.
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likely to observe or discover his action." 17 6 Johnson was charged with violating
the statute after burning a flag during a political demonstration.'7 7
Texas offered two justifications for its statute: it wanted to prevent distur-
bances of the peace, and it wanted to maintain "the flag as a symbol of ...
national unity."'78 The Court discounted the first justification as unworthy of
belief and dismissed the second justification as incompatible with the First
Amendment.' 79
The Court rejected the State's argument that the statute was necessary for the
maintenance of peace and order for three reasons. First, the Court examined the
record and concluded that "no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or
threatened to occur" in reaction to Johnson's burning of the flag.'8 0 Conse-
quently, the Court expressed skepticism about the claim that actual disturbances
justified either the statute or the prosecution of Johnson.
Second, the State could not justify the statute on the assumption that distur-
bances would occur because flag burning is likely to arouse the passions and
provoke a violent reaction from onlookers.18 ' The Court explained that the
government is not permitted to "assume that every expression of a provocative
idea will incite a riot."'8 2 Indeed, an important purpose of speech, the Court
exclaimed, is to provoke "a condition of unrest, create[] dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stir[] people to anger."' 83 A state may not
regulate speech on the basis of non-speakers' reaction until it evaluates carefully
"the actual circumstances surrounding such expression, asking whether the
expression 'is directed to inciting or producing lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action."",18 4 The Court concluded that permitting the state
to regulate flag burning on the basis of mere speculation would amount to
sanctioning state regulation of protected speech, a proposition that is deeply at
odds with the First Amendment's core values.' 85
Finally, the Court noted that if Texas needed to guard against imminent
violence, it already had a statute on the books governing breaches of the
peace.'8 6 In view of the existence of such a statute and given the fact that
disturbances did not actually occur in reaction to the defendant's speech,
Texas's claim that the flag burning statute was necessary to prevent disturbances
of the peace could not be believed.
The State's second justification-preservation of the flag as a symbol of
176. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(a)(3) (1988).
177. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399-400.
178. Id. at 407.
179. See id.
180. Id. at 408.
181. See id. at 408-09.
182. Id. at 409.
183. Id. at 408-09 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
184. Id. at 409 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
185. See id. at 408-09.
186. Id. at410.
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national unity-received a different, though no better, treatment from the Court.
The Court accepted the State's argument that the statute was necessary for the
preservation of the flag as a symbol of nationhood. However, the Court con-
cluded that this justification is content-based and insufficiently compelling to
survive the Court's "most exacting scrutiny."'18 7 The Texas statute was content-
based because whether the defendant violated the statute depended upon "the
likely communicative impact of his expressive conduct."' 88 Only flag burnings
that communicated a message inimical to the conception of the flag as a symbol
of national unity violated the statute.'89
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the statute is unconstitutional
because it is a species of viewpoint discrimination. As the Court noted:
The state's argument is not that it has an interest simply in maintaining the
flag as a symbol of something, no matter what is symbolizes; indeed, if that
were the State's position, it would be difficult to see how that interest is
endangered by highly symbolic conduct such as Johnson's. Rather, the State's
claim is that it has an interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood
and national unity, a symbol with a determinate range of meanings. Accord-
ing to Texas, if one physically treats the flag in a way that would tend to cast
doubt on either the idea that nationhood and national unity are the flag's
referents or that national unity actually exists, the message conveyed thereby
is a harmful one and therefore may be prohibited.'90
The state proscribed flag burning simply to prevent the defendant (and others
like him) from using the flag as a means of communicating his socio-political
dissatisfaction.' 9 ' The First Amendment does not permit the state to "forbid flag
burning wherever it is likely to endanger the flag's symbolic role, but allow it
wherever burning a flag promotes that role."'92 The Court concluded that the
state cannot "criminally punish a person for burning the flag as a means of
political protest."'93
As Professor Amar has noted, Texas v. Johnson is "plainly right, and even
easy-indeed, as right and easy a case [as exists] in modem constitutional
law."'94 Once one concedes that flag burning is protected speech, the case is
easy and right because the state's illegitimate justification becomes apparent.
When an individual burns a flag, the individual is almost invariably communicat-
187. Id. at 412.
188. Id. at411.
189. Id. at 410 (noting that the statute regulates content because the statute is implicated only when
"a person's treatment of the flag communicates some expression").
190. Id. at413.
191. See id. at 411 ("[The] law is . .. not aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all
circumstances, but is designed instead to protect it only against impairments that would cause serious
offense to others.").
192. Id. at416.
193. Id. at418.
194. Amar, supra note 12, at 125.
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ing a socio-political message, which is unquestionably protected under the First
Amendment. Correspondingly, when the state promulgates legislation banning
flag burning, the state can only be concerned with the message communicated
by the incident. Thus, as soon as one eliminates the argument that flag burning
is special and thus ought to be treated like obscenity or fighting words, the
government's justification is not entitled to any deference. That is, once there is
no longer a factual dispute about how flag burning affects the body politic, the
state cannot demand deference to its view.
Consider next United States v. Eichman,195 decided the term following
Johnson. In Eichman, the Court struck down a federal anti-flag burning statute
on the ground that the statute violated the First Amendment. 19 6 The statute
provided that:
Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, bums, maintains
on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
This subsection does not prohibit any conduct consisting of the disposal of
a flag when it has become wom or soiled.197
The government attempted to justify the statute on two grounds. First, the
government argued that the Court should reconsider its decision in Johnson and
hold that flag burning "does not enjoy the full protection of the First Amend-
ment."'98 The Court unceremoniously rejected that argument. 199 Second, the
government argued that, unlike Texas's statute, this federal statute is content-
neutral.200 The government explained that the Texas statute was unconstitu-
tional because it prohibited flag burning only when burning the flag would
seriously offend a spectator.201 In contrast, the federal statute did not contain
any such limitations. It sought to "'protect the physical integrity of the flag
under all circumstances ... without regard to the actor's motive, his intended
message, or to the likely effects of his conduct on onlookers." 202 The Court
also summarily disposed of this argument.203
The Court concluded that even without the telltale markers of speech infringe-
ment that were present in Johnson, the statute reflected the government's intent
to regulate protected speech.204 Though the statute did not evidence an "explicit
195. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
196. See id. The statute was passed by Congress in response to the Court's decision in Johnson.
197. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
198. See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. See Id.
202. Id.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 315-16.
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content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct," 205 the Court
nevertheless concluded that it is "clear that the Government's asserted interest"
in promulgating the statute can be justified only on the basis of the content of
the speech.206 Because the government did not offer any legitimate justifications
for the statute, speech infringement is the only reasonable explanation for its
passage.207
In addition, the Court also commented on the words chosen by Congress to
delineate the scope of the statute's prohibition. The Court concluded that those
words-mutilate, deface, defile, trample, and perhaps even bum-connoted
"disrespectful treatment of the flag and suggest[ed] a focus on those acts likely
to damage the flag's symbolic value."208 Similarly, the statutory exemption for
activities associated with proper disposal of, and respect for, the flag removed
all doubts that the statute was related to the suppression of speech. 209
Johnson and Eichman demonstrate the ease with which one can dispose of
state justifications for speech infringement when the state cannot regulate on the
basis of a permissible criterion. Flag burning can reasonably communicate one
message: social or political dissatisfaction. Because flag burning does not
communicate multiple messages that differ in their constitutionality, there is no
need to smoke out the state's illegitimate justification. Consequently, flag
burning does not present an epistemic dilemma because there is no need to
choose among competing justifications.210
Statutes regulating flag burning are not entitled to any deference; therefore,
they are per se unconstitutional. Thus flag burning legislation, instead of
engendering indecision or an epistemic impasse, gives rise to deep judicial
skepticism.
In contrast to flag burnings, cross burnings may simultaneously communicate
two types of messages of different constitutional standing: true threats and
white supremacy. Whether one believes that statutes targeting cross burnings
are per se unconstitutional depends upon whether one trusts that the government
is acting in order to address a genuine harm or whether one believes the
government is using the statute as a guise for message suppression. Supporters
of statutes regulating cross burning often emphasize the harn caused by such
conduct and the necessity of regulation.21 1 They argue that race-based hate
205. Id. at 315.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 316.
208. Id. at317.
209. See id. at 317-18.
210. Or put differently, to the extent that one believes the state's justification, the justification would
not be consistent with the First Amendment.
211. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 416 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring)("Conduct that creates special risks or causes special harms may be prohibited by special rules."); see
also id. at 424 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the "judgment ... that harms caused by racial,
religious, and gender-based invective are qualitatively different from that caused by other fighting
words ... seems ... eminently reasonable and realistic"); see also Robert C. Post, Racist Speech,
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activity is different from other types of speech-based conduct that are protected
by the First Amendment. 21 2 In addition, they argue that First Amendment
doctrine is sufficiently capacious to accommodate legislation regulating hate-
based activity.21 3 Thus, for supporters of such legislation, while these statutes
might violate the constitution on overbreadth grounds, they are not per se
unconstitutional. Moreover, because the statutes address an important harm,
proponents are more likely to believe the government when it maintains that it
is legislating on the basis of the harm and not on the basis of the protected
messages that may also be communicated by hate-based activity.21 4
Opponents of statutes that regulate hate-based activity tend to disbelieve the
government when it claims that such regulations are not aimed at speech
suppression. While opponents generally agree that activities like cross burning
cause harm, they reject the contention that the state should "treat racial hate
speech differently from other forms of hate-filled expression."21 5 Whereas
proponents of hate speech legislation focus on the harm caused by such speech,
opponents of hate speech statutes are motivated by the worry that the state is
attempting to promote a politically correct viewpoint-for example racial toler-
ance-while at the same time suppressing a political viewpoint that it deems
harmful to the body politic-for example speech that denigrates on the basis of
race.216 For opponents of statutes regulating cross burning, state actors cannot
single out cross burning for regulation without violating the First Amendment.
However, because cross burnings often communicate both messages simulta-
neousiy, and because those messages are interrelated, it is difficult to discern
whether the state is regulating on the basis of a permissible or impermissible
Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 290-325 (1991) (summarizing
arguments).
212. See, e.g., David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDozo L. REv. 445, 458 (1987)
("[R]acism is unique. This uniqueness is not of itself a sufficient argument for restricting racist speech.
It does, however, reveal why a discrete argument for restricting such speech may be made which does
not apply to all other doctrines or ideas that may be considered offensive or dangerous."); Charles R.
Lawrence IEm, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech On Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431,
459 ('To engage in a debate about the first amendment and racist speech without a full understanding of
the nature and extent of the harm of racist speech risks making the first amendment an instrument of
domination rather than a vehicle of liberation.").
213. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Legal Storytelling: Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2356-61 (1989) (arguing that a sufficiently explicit and
narrow definition of racist hate messages can allow for their restriction in a manner consistent with the
First Amendment); Lawrence, supra note 212, at 449-57 (arguing that instances of racist speech are
functionally equivalent to fighting words).
214. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda & Charles R. Lawrence Im, Epilogue: Burning Crosses and the
R.A.V. Case, in MARI MATSUDA ET AL., WoRDs THAT WouND: CRmcAL RACE THEORY, AssAuLTIVE SPEECH,
AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 133, 135 (1993) ("Hate crime ordinances came about not because local
legislators were bent on oppressing a tiny minority of unpopular racists, but because hate crimes had
reached such an epidemic proportion that no one concerned with keeping the peace could ignore
them.").
215. See Amar, supra note 12, at 125-26.
216. Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 193, 204
(1996).
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criterion. In this respect, courts are always operating at an epistemic disadvan-
tage. They do not really know whether a state's justification is legitimate vel
non. This prevents courts from determining with ease or confidence whether
they should believe or doubt the state's justification-hence, the epistemic
dilemma. How to resolve this epistemic dilemma is the fundamental question in
R.A. V.
This epistemic dilemma is necessarily a question of trust, and therefore
epistemic deference; or distrust, and thus epistemic skepticism. Correspond-
ingly, where one draws the line depends upon the type of error that one finds
tolerable. A constitutional posture that legitimates statutes that proscribe cross
burnings risks an environment that undermines speech and facilitates govern-
ment suppression of speech. Conversely, a constitutional posture that is hostile
to cross-burning statutes risks an environment in which the government's
attempt to address a genuine harm is frustrated by an unnecessarily restrictive
constitutional doctrine. 217
The constitutionality of statutes targeting cross burning therefore depends in
great part on whether one is inclined to believe that cross burnings present a
special type of harm; whether one believes that the state is regulating pursuant
to that harm; and whether the state has alternative means at its disposal for
addressing the putative harm caused by cross burnings. The absence of those
three elements results in an almost absolute rejection of the constitutionality of
cross burning statutes.
R.A. V is best explained precisely along these lines. Justice Scalia and the
R.A. V majority were convinced that cross burnings do not present a distinctive
harm. Moreover, they were also certain that even if the harms caused by cross
burnings were distinctive, the state was not regulating pursuant to that harm. If
the Court in R.A. V was correct in its assessment of the harm presented by cross
burnings and the propensity of the state to regulate the message as opposed to
the harm, it owed no deference to the state's justifications. In fact, the Court was
entitled, as it did, to draw a near-absolutist line on statutes regulating cross
burning. Thus, R.A. V stands for the proposition that statutes regulating cross
burning are virtually always unconstitutional. The majority's somewhat uncon-
ventional doctrinal approach represented its distrust of the state and its skepti-
cism that the state is regulating a unique type of harm.
Justice Souter's position in Black very much tracked Justice Scalia's in
R.A.V. Justice Souter, as did Justice Scalia before him, viewed the content
limitation of the statute as a telltale sign of the state's intent to engage in
suppression of a politically incorrect message.218 Justice Souter was also skepti-
217. See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1321, 1351-55 (1992).
218. Compare R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) ("In fact the only interestdistinctively served by the content limitation is that of displaying the city council's special hostility
towards the particular biases singled out."), and id. at 392 ("St. Paul's brief aserts that a general
'fighting words' law would not meet the city's needs because only a content-specific measure can
communicate to minority groups that the 'group hatred' aspect of such speech is not condoned by the
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cal of the state's ability to regulate cross burning on the basis of a permissible
criterion.21 9
By contrast, the majority in Black attempted to walk a finer line. It endeav-
ored to accommodate the perceived state interest, which it found credible, with
its concern about speech suppression, as indicated by its (unconvincing) analy-
sis of the prima facie provision of the statute. 220
IV. BL4CK CANNOT BE SQUARED wiTH R.A. V.
If my reading of R.A. V is correct, then Black cannot be squared with R.A. V.,
notwithstanding Justice O'Connor's protestations to the contrary. Justice
O'Connor, speaking for the Court, first attempted to distinguish R.A.V on the
ground that the statute in R.A. V singled out for protection the speech of certain
favored categories, such as race and gender, whereas the Virginia statute did not
create any preferred categories.221 She then went on to note that under the
Virginia statute, it "does not matter whether an individual burns a cross with
intent to intimidate because of the victim's race, gender, or religion, or because
of the victim's 'political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality."'22 2
This initial attempt to distinguish R.A.V is thoroughly unpersuasive. While
the Virginia statute prohibits an individual from burning a cross with intent to
intimidate regardless of the victim's race, religion, gender, etc., it is no less a
content-based distinction than the St. Paul ordinance at issue in R.A. V. Just as
St. Paul singled out a favored category (race, gender, and religion), Virginia
selected one content-based category-cross burnings that communicate a threat-
ening message-and prohibited intimidation on the basis of that category.223
The difference between Virginia's statute and St. Paul's ordinance is the level
of generality at which the respective statutes operate. Although Virginia's
statute regulates more generally than does St. Paul's ordinance, both regulate
majority."), with Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 386-87 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("It is difficult to conceive of an intimidation case that would be easier to prove than
one with cross burning, assuming any circumstances suggesting intimidation are present. The provision,
apparently so unnecessary to legitimate prosecution of intimidation, is therefore quite enough to raise
the question whether Virginia's content-based statute seeks more than mere protection against a virulent
form of intimidation... . [A] content-neutral statute banning intimidation would achieve the same
object without singling out particular content.").
219. Black, 538 U.S. at 383 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The cross may
have been selected because of its special power to threaten, but it may also have been singled out
because of disapproval of its message of white supremacy, either because a legislature thought white
supremacy was a perncious doctrine or because it found that dramatic, public espousal of it was a civic
embarrassment.").
220. For a persuasive refuation of the majority's analysis of the prima facie provision, see Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion. Id. at 368-71 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
221. Black, 538 U.S. at 361-62
222. Id. at 362.
223. See, e.g., id. at 381 (Souter, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) ("Although the
Virginia statute in issue here contains no such express 'basis of' limitation on prohibited subject matter,
the specific prohibition of cross burning with intent to intimidate selects a symbol with particular
content from the field of all proscribable expression meant to intimidate.").
---- -- 
__ 
----- 
-- __ 
-
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content. Consequently, they cannot be convincingly distinguished on the ground
that the ordinance "discriminated on the basis of content by targeting only those
individuals who 'provoke violence' on [the] basis [of race, color, creed, religion
or gender]." 2 4 Virginia's statute targets individuals who use crosses as a basis
of intimidation. Thus, the regulations are analogous and one must conclude that
they are equally content-based.225
The majority's second attempt is more promising, at least at first blush. It
recognizes that an anti-cross-burning statute is a content-based regulation and
attempts to fit cross-burning regulations within one of the exceptions delineated
in R.A. V. The Court remarked that the "First Amendment permits Virginia to
outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross
is a particularly virulent form of intimidation." 22 6 In light of "cross burning's
long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence," Virginia may
choose to regulate cross burning as a type of intimidation that is "most likely to
inspire fear and bodily harm."227
The majority found that Virginia's prohibition on cross burnings is saved
through R.A.V's primary effects exception: the state may engage in content-
based regulation within a prohibited category when the state is regulating on the
basis of the prohibited category's primary effects. 228 Thus, a "ban on cross
burning carried out with intent to intimidate is fully consistent with our holding
in R.A.YV and is proscribable under the First Amendment." 229 Accordingly, the
state may prohibit cross burnings when the perpetrator's intent is to intimidate
the victim.
This view would be plausible if it did not contradict R.A.V's holding and
analysis. On the basis of Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Black, Justice Scalia
should have similarly applied the primary effects exception to the St. Paul
ordinance. If Virginia can permissibly regulate cross burning because Virginia is
regulating "a particularly virulent form of intimidation," one could argue that
St. Paul should have been able to single out fighting words uttered on the basis
of race, gender, and religion because such fighting words are likely to cause
anger and incite immediate violence. Notably, the Constitution is not neutral
with respect to discrimination on the basis of racial, gender, and religious
identity; it demonstrates a clear commitment to racial, gender, and religious
equality. If cross burning itself is a particularly virulent type of intimidation,
224. Id.at 361.
225. One could argue that the Court objected in R.A.V to the fact that race was singled out as a basis
for regulation. Cf. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that bizarre, race-based-and only
bizarre, race-based-districting may violate the Fourteenth Amendment). That argument, as odd as it
may be, would probably square Black with R.A. V. However, that is not the argument that the majority
in Black advanced. It argued that R.A. V objected to content-based distinctions as a general matter, not
content-based distinctions on the basis of race. Black, 538 U.S. at 561-63.
226. Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
227. Id.
228. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,388 (1992).
229. Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
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then burning a cross on the basis of the victim's race must certainly be an even
more virulent type of intimidation. On the basis of this reasoning, R.A.YV is a
stronger case than Black. That is, if one were to apply Black's reasoning to
R.A.V, not only should the Court have upheld St. Paul's ordinance, but the
ordinance presented a more compelling case for affirmance than the statute in
Black.
However, Justice Scalia explicitly rejected this reasoning in R.A. V.230 Indeed,
Justice White, in his concurring opinion in R.A. V., took the majority to task on
the basis of precisely this logic. As Justice White noted:
The ordinance proscribes a subset of "fighting words," those that injure "on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." This selective regulation
reflects the city's judgment that harms based on race, color, creed, religion, or
gender are more pressing public concerns than the harms caused by other
fighting words. In light of our Nation's long and painful experience with
discrimination, this determination is plainly reasonable. Indeed, as the major-
ity concedes, the interest is compelling.231
Thus, if the R.A. V. Court had followed Black's reasoning, it would have upheld
the constitutionality of the St. Paul ordinance. Since R.A. V foreclosed that line
of argument, however, Justice O'Connor's attempt to distinguish Black from
R.A. V pursuant to the primary effects exception must fail. If Black comes under
the primary effects exception, so does R.A. V, and both regulations are constitu-
tional.
One can also apply Justice Scalia's reasoning in R.A.V to strike down the
statute in Black. Recall that in R.A.V, the St. Paul ordinance did not come
within the scope of the primary effects exception because St. Paul did not
regulate a particular "mode of expression" but sought to shape the content of
public discourse. 232 It is unclear how the Court arrived at the conclusion that the
St. Paul ordinance reflected the city's intent to suppress speech, but it seemed to
place a lot of weight on the city's belief that cross burnings were particularly
harmful to its citizens of color, and the city's desire to communicate to its
citizens of color that the city did not condone racist and white supremacist
speech. In particular, the Court seemed to have deduced the city's illicit intent
primarily from the fact that the city singled out cross burnings for special
treatment. 233 As the Court explained, the city wanted to single out cross
burnings for special treatment so that it could express its "special hostility" for
230. R.A.YV, 505 U.S. at 393 ("St. Paul has not singled out an especially offensive mode of
expression-it has not, for example, selected for prohibition only those fighting words that communi-
cate ideas in a threatening (as opposed to a merely obnoxious) manner."); see supra text accompanying
note 94.
231. Id. at 407 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
232. Id. at 393-94.
233. Id. at 393, 396.
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the message communicated by cross burnings.2 34 This observation, coupled
with St. Paul's protection of ostensibly politically correct categories-race,
gender, and religion-led the Court to conclude that St. Paul objected to the
message communicated by cross burnings as opposed to the legitimate harms
suffered by the victims of cross burnings.235
Given that the St. Paul ordinance cannot be saved by any of the exceptions to
content-based distinctions, the statute could only survive if it is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 236 The Court in R.A. V conceded
that the ordinance served a compeling state interest, to "ensure the basic human
rights of members of groups that have historically been subjected to discrimina-
tion,"237 but it was not sufficiently narrowly tailored. The city could have
enacted a more general ordinance if it really wanted to prevent perpetrators
from burning crosses in other people's front yards. The city had "sufficient
means at its disposal to prevent such behavior[s] without adding the First
Amendment to the fire."238 This reasoning can also be applied to the statute in
Black.
In fact, Justice Souter advanced a similar argument in Black. According to
Justice Souter, the primary effects exception applies only when a statute regu-
lates speech "'entirely' on the 'basis' of 'the very reason' that 'the entire class of
speech at issue is proscribable' at all."239 Justice Souter argued that contrary to
the majority's assertion, Virginia's cross-burning statute was not saved by the
primary effects exception because the statute defined a content-based subclass-
cross burnings-on the basis of the particular message communicated by the
subclass.240 Justice Souter argued that the cross is a symbol that can communi-
cate multiple messages and thus cannot be regulated entirely on the basis of its
234. Id. at 396.
235. Justice Scalia purports to derive from the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion upholding the
statute, and the city's brief before the United States Supreme Court supporting the statute, the idea that
the ordinance is necessary to communicate to the city's citizens of color that the majority disapproves
of the message that cross burning communicates. Id. at 392. But the quoted passage does a disservice to
the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion and to the city's statement of the ordinance's purpose. While
one may argue that the Minnesota Supreme Court was unsuccessful in its attempt to save the statute, it
is difficult to maintain that that court viewed the statute as an attempt to suppress ideas based upon
white supremacy as opposed to an attempt to suppress violence that is motivated by white supremacist
ideals. See In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510-11 (Minn. 1991), rev'd sub. nom. R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (reflecting the Court's attempt to limit the ordinance to conduct that "inflicts
injury" or incites imminent lawless action). Similarly, a more accurate statement is the city's contention
in its brief that "the Ordinance is intended not to impact the right of free expression of the accused but
rather to protect against the victimization of a person or persons who are particularly vulnerable
because of their membership in a group that historically has been discriminated against." Respondent's
Brief at 28, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (No. 90-7675).
236. R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 395.
237. Id.
238. Id. at396.
239. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 381 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
240. Id. at381-82.
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putative primary effect.24 ' As he explained:
The cross may have been selected because of its special power to threaten, but
it may also have been singled out because of disapproval of its message of
white supremacy, either because a legislature thought white supremacy was a
pernicious doctrine or because it found that dramatic, public espousal of it
was a civic embarrassment ....
... A content-based proscription of cross burning . .. may be a subtle effort
to ban not only the intensity of the intimidation cross burning causes when
done to threaten, but also the particular message of white supremacy that is
broadcast even by nonthreatening cross burning.242
Some of these messages are constitutionally protected-for example, messages
based upon ideology. Others are not-such as messages that fall under the
category of true threats. Further, when one combines the prima facie intent
provision with the expressive message communicated by cross burnings, the
primary effects rationale is untenable as a basis of constitutionality.2' 3
Justice Souter's opinion demonstrates the applicability of R.A.V to Black.
Thus, irrespective of one's view of the constitutionality of Black and R.A.V,
these are similar cases that cannot be easily distinguished. Black's similarity to
R.A.V becomes all the more inescapable if one gives effect to R.A.V's view-
point discrimination prong. Recall Justice Scalia's admonition that the state
could not "license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the
other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules." 244 One could argue that cross
burning is the most potent arrow in the white supremacist's quiver.7 45 Those
who wish to deliver a message of racial harmony are extremely unlikely to use
cross burning as their mode of communication. Consequently, when the state
regulates cross burning, it is undoubtedly handicapping one side of the debate.
Thus, Black's facile conclusion that "[a] ban on cross burning carried out
with the intent to intimidate is fully consistent with ... R.A. V"246 is fully
unsound. If the statute in R.A.Y is unconstitutional, so is the one in Black.
Conversely, if Black is correct, then the Court was wrong in R.A. V In any event,
Black cannot be squared with R.A. V As Professor Schauer has aptly concluded,
"there exist two mutually exclusive precedents with no clear indication that the
latter supercedes the former."247
241. Id. at 382-84.
242. Id. at 383-84.
243. See id. at 382-85.
244. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992).
245. In fact, the Court's review of the history of cross burning in the United States proves as much.
See Black, 538 U.S. at 352-57.
246. Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
247. Schauer, supra note 134, at 209.
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V. JUSTICE THOMAS'S CONTRIBUTION
A. JUSTICE THOMAS'S VIEWS ON CROSS BURNING
If R.A. V is properly interpreted as prohibiting state statutes that single out
cross burnings for regulation, what accounts for the Court's decision in Black?
To understand why R.A. V and Black come out so differently, one must come to
grips with the role that Justice Thomas played in Black. Anyone who listened to
or witnessed the Supreme Court oral arguments in Black could not help but be
struck by the manner in which Justice Thomas's comments on the meaning of
cross burnings single-handedly changed the nature of the proceedings.248 What
is most remarkable about Justice Thomas's participation in Black (other than the
fact that he spoke out at all), especially when considered in contrast to his
participation in R.A.V, in which he joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion, is
that Justice Thomas analyzed the harm caused by cross burning from his
perspective as a person of color.249 Justice Thomas brought sensitivity to the
issue that he had acquired on the basis of his experiences as an African
American.250
Examine this remarkable exchange during oral argument in Black, which
occurred while the Deputy Solicitor General of the Department of Justice was
arguing in favor of the constitutionality of the Virginia statute:
[Justice Thomas]: Mr. Dreeben, aren't you understating the-the effects
of-of the burning cross?
[Justice Thomas]: Now it's my understanding that we had almost 100 years
of lynching and activity in the South by the Knights of Camellia and-and the
Ku Klux Klan, and this was a reign of terror and the cross was a symbol of
248. Dahlia Lithwick, Opinion-Editorial, Personal Truths and Legal Fictions, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 17,
2002, at A35 (stating that Justice Thomas's "words changed the tenor of the debate, if not the minds of
his colleagues, about the role of the law and the definition of justice"); see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Striking a Balance on Hate Speech, 39 TRALm 78 (2003).
249. For a broader discussion of the voice of color, see Robert S. Chang, Toward An Asian American
Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV.
1241, 1268-71 (1993); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the
Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IowA L. REv. 803,
830-42 (1994); and Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007, 2043-52
(1991). For a skeptical view, see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School, 45
STAN. L. REV. 807, 809 (1993).
250. It is not clear to me why Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia in R.A. V. without writing or
speaking, but dissented so vigorously in Black. One can surmise that perhaps as a new member of the
Court, Justice Thomas did not want to make waves. (R.A. V. was argued in December of the 1991 term,
Thomas's first on the Court.) Or perhaps Justice Thomas concluded that his confirmation battles,
framed by race, would have undernined his credibility to speak on behalf of citizens of color. Or
perhaps he only later came to terms with the meaning of cross burning or the ability to reconcile
statutes that prohibit cross burning with the First Amendment. Or perhaps this is Justice Thomas's way
of reaching out to the civil rights community. These are all hypotheses; I am not clear as to what
changed for Justice Thomas between R.A. V. and Black.
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that reign of terror. Was-isn't that significantly greater than intimidation or a
threat?
Answer: Well, I think they're coextensive, Justice Thomas, because it is-
[Justice Thomas]: Well, my fear is, Mr. Dreeben, that you're actually
understating the symbolism on-of and the effect of the cross, the burning
cross. I-I indicated, I think, in the Ohio case that the cross was not a
religious symbol and that it has-it was intended to have a virulent effect.
And I-I think that what you're attempting to do is to fit this into our
jurisprudence rather than stating more clearly what the cross was intended to
accomplish and, indeed, that is unlike any symbol in our society ....
... [M]y fear is that the-there was no other purpose to the cross. There
was no communication of a particular message. It was intended to cause fear
... and to terrorize a population. 251
Justice Thomas expanded further on this theme in his dissent in Black. He
adopted a voice of color at the very beginning of his dissent. He began by
noting that in "every culture, certain things acquire meaning well beyond what
outsiders can comprehend."252 Quoting from a Ninth Circuit case, he explained
that to African-Americans cross burnings signify: "'[m]urder, hanging, rape,
lynching. Just about anything bad that you can name. It is the worst thing that
can happen to a person."'253 He provides a short history of cross burnings in the
United States and then proceeds to explain that the burning cross has and can
only have one meaning: an intent to intimidate.254
In that regard, his analysis does not differ much from that of the majority. But
the lesson that he derives from his historical overview has wider doctrinal
implications than that of the majority. On the basis of this history, he concludes
that "[i]n our culture, cross burning has almost invariably meant lawlessness
and understandably instills in its victims well-grounded fear of physical vio-
251. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22-24, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107)
[hereinafter Transcript].
252. Black, 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Now, one could question what it is that he
means by "outsiders." Does he mean non-Americans? Whites? Americans who are not of African
descent? I think he means all three. Justice Thomas's opinion is careful to promote a sort of racial
ecumenism. Cross burning is a tool that is used to intimidate African-Americans, but it is not limited to
African-Americans. Justice Thomas explains that "the perception that a burning cross is a threat and a
precursor of worse things to come is not limited to blacks [b]ecause the modern Klan expanded the list
of its enemies beyond blacks and 'radicals,' to include Catholics, Jews, most immigrants, and labor
unions." Id. at 1564. Thus, "our culture" begins with African-Americans, but is soon expanded to
include all Americans. Of course this move is a bit disingenuous. That Justice Thomas finds it necessary
to explain "our culture" to some of us is indicative of the fact that we do not share the same culture, or
at least that we do not share it in the same way. Justice Thomas's comments during oral argument and
his dissent derive their power from the realization that his culture does not overlap perfectly with the
culture of his colleagues. We are not all equally likely to understand the harm caused by cross burning
because we do not all share the same culture.
253. Black, 538 U.S. at 390 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Skillman, 922 F.2d
1370, 1378 (9th Cir. 1991).
254. Black, 538 U.S. at 392-93.
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lence." 255 Consequently, a ban on cross burnings carried out with an intent to
intimidate prohibits conduct only; it does not limit any constitutionally pro-
tected expression. He also reviews Virginia's experience with cross burning and
concludes that the purpose of the Virginia statute is not to limit racist speech,
256but to deter the Klan's terroristic activities. Moreover, he maintains that the
prima facie provision constitutes a rebuttable presumption and therefore does
not raise any problems under the First Amendment.257
B. JUSTICE THOMAS: EPISTEMIC AUTHORJTY AND EPISTEMIC DEFERENCE
Justice Thomas's comments during oral argument in Black are noteworthy
both because he rarely asks questions during oral arguments and because of the
impact those comments had on his colleagues. By all accounts, Justice Tho-
mas's statements appeared to have a tremendous effect on his fellow Justices.258
One cannot help but believe that Justice Thomas's active participation, includ-
ing his dissent as well as his statements during oral argument, best explains the
Court's decision to turn away from the absolutist position of R.A. V to the more
flexible and nuanced approach reflected in Black. Thus, while Justice Thomas's
position did not ultimately prevail in Black, it certainly framed the disposition
of the case.
To understand how Justice Thomas may have contributed to the resolution of
this case, one must begin with the philosophical concept of epistemic authority.
Generally speaking, epistemic authority is invoked when one accepts a factual
assertion as true because someone else-someone with epistemic authority-
says that it is true.259 Epistemic authority is an analytical tool used to resolve
uncertainty. Determining whether a person is entitled to epistemic deference, on
the basis of his or her epistemic authority, requires that one navigate through a
series of inquiries with respect to who should be believed, under what circum-
stances, and with respect to what issues.260 As political and legal philosopher
Don Herzog remarks, epistemic authority and epistemic deference are always
255. Id. at 391.
256. Id. at394.
257. Id. at 398.
258. Linda Greenhouse, An Intense Attack by Justice Thomas on Cross-Burning, N.Y TIMES, Dec.
12, 2002, at Al ("The case, concerning a 50-year-old Virginia law, raised tricky questions of First
Amendment doctrine, and it was not clear how the court was inclined to decide it-until Justice
Clarence Thomas spoke."); see also Charles Lane, High Court Hears Thomas on KKK Rite: Justice
Weighs In on Va. Cross-Burning Ban, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2002, at Al ("The debate's emotional high
point was provided by the usually taciturn Justice Clarence Thomas.").
259. See, e.g., Richard T. De George, The Function and Limits of Epistenmic Authority, 8 S.J. Pin.
199 (1970) ("Epistemic authority is authority which is based on knowledge."); see also DON HERZOG,
POISONING THE MINDS OF THE LOWER ORDERS 156 (1998); Richard T. De George, The Nature and
Function of Epistemic Authority, in Amo=rurv: A PmLosoPmcAL ANALYSis 79-80 (R. Baine Harris ed.,
1976). For other useful discussions of epistemic authority, see JOSEPH RAz, THE MoRALrry OF FREEDoM
38-69 (1986); Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J.
1535, 1586-96 (1998); Heidi M. Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100 YALE L.J. 1611 (1991).
260. Don Herzog, Up from Individualism, 86 CAL. L. REV. 459,465 (1998)
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261part of the conversation.
As a matter of brute fact, we are hugely and irrevocably dependent on others
for what we know. I believe the Soviet Union fell in 1989 because I read
about it in the newspapers: that is, because other people told me. "But you
saw a bit of it, with your own eyes, on TV!" That is, I saw scenes that other
people told me were the fall of the Soviet Union. "You could fly there
yourself!" That is, I could get on a plane and fly to a place that others would
tell me is Russia and the people there would tell me about what happened in
1989.262
Fundamentally, what we know depends upon whom we believe (and vice
versa). Whom we believe is a question of epistemic authority.
Statutes prohibiting cross burnings present courts with an epistemic problem:
is the state regulating cross burning because of its politically unpalatable
message or because cross burnings cause special harms? To the extent that one
believes that cross burnings, and hate speech more generally, cause a unique
kind of harm, one would be more inclined to conclude that anti-cross-burning
statutes are constitutional. Conversely, to the extent that one believes that cross
burnings are similar to other types of prohibited conduct, one would be more
inclined to believe that statutes specifically targeting cross burnings for regula-
tion are really not concerned with the harm that cross burnings cause but with
the message that they communicate.
Remember that the majority in R.A.Y refused to defer to the views of the
state. But Black is different. Why? Because Justice Thomas spoke up. Justice
Thomas-an African-American colleague, a conservative, raised in the South, a
victim of racism-possesses epistemic authority and commands epistemic defer-
ence. He alone on the Court is positioned to explain, on the basis of what he
knows to be true and what he has experienced as a person of color, the
distinctive harm caused by cross burnings from the perspective of one of its
likely victims. When Justice Thomas maintains that the cross is unlike any other
symbol in our society, he cannot be dismissed simply as a purveyor of political
correctness, as were the critical race theorists and St. Paul in R.A. V, or ignored,
as were the concurrences in R.A.YV His colleagues must acknowledge his
contentions. Justice Thomas's participation in Black exemplifies how experi-
ence creates knowledge, and it is that experiential knowledge that forms the
basis for his epistemic authority.263
As soon as one defers to Justice Thomas on the question of harm, the burden
shifts to the skeptic to explain why the First Amendment cannot accommodate a
narrowly drawn cross-burning statute. Consider the following exchange be-
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. For an argument about the relationship between experience and knowledge, see PATRICIA J.
WILIAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RiGHTs 44-51, 166-78 (1991).
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tween Justice O'Connor and Dean Smolla, once again at oral argument:
[Dean] Smolla: -as-as powerful as that point is [that the purpose of cross
burning is to terrorize]-and I totally accept it, and totally accept the history
that Justice Thomas has-has recounted, and that the United States recounts
in its brief as accurate. As powerful as all of those points are, there's not a
single interest that society seeks to protect in protecting that victim that
cannot be vindicated perfectly as well, exactly as well with no fall-off at all,
by content-neutral alternatives, not merely general run-of-the-mill threat laws,
or incitement laws, or intimidation laws which may have an antiseptic and
sterile quality about them. You can go even beyond that-
[Justice O'Connor]: But why isn't this just a regulation of a particularly
virulent form of intimidation? And why can't the State regulate such things?
[Dean] Smolla: Your Honor, it is not a particularly virulent form of
intimidation.
[Justice O'Connor]: Well, it is for the very reasons we've explored this
morning. What if I think it is? Why can't the State regulate it?264
Note that one cannot have it both ways. One must either accept Justice
Thomas's account or reject it. Attempting to have it both ways, as Dean Smolla
tried at oral argument, places one in the awkward position of arguing that even
though as a matter of real-world historical fact the (sole) purpose of cross
burning is to intimidate its victims, the state is nevertheless powerless to target
cross burnings because of the First Amendment. The argument rings hollow,265
and Dean Smolla's otherwise perfectly acceptable argument-the availability of
content-neutral alternatives, which prevailed in R.A. V-no longer suffices. The
content-neutral alternative is a winning argument only when the reviewing court
is skeptical of the state's motives; it fails once the court agrees that the state is
264. Transcript, supra note 251, at 31. Consider also the following colloquy:
Question: In other words, all it-all it-all you're saying is that heightened scrutiny applies.
[Dean] Smolla: We are certainly saying that, and-
Question: That's all you're saying. You can't possibly say more than that once you
acknowledge that-that symbols can be proscribed.
[Dean] Smolla: We-we say that-
Question: And so the question before us whether burning a cross is such a terrorizing
symbol in American-in American culture that even on the basis of heightened scrutiny, it's
okay to proscribe it. That's basically the-
[Dean] Smolla: That is a-that is a fair characterization of the question.
Id. at 36-37.
265. The argument is similar to one advanced by Justice Holmes in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475
(1903). In Giles, African-American plaintiffs filed suit challenging Alabama's registration scheme on
the ground that it was designed to disenfranchise that state's African-American voters. While Holmes,
who wrote the Court's opinion in the case, agreed that the plaintiff had suffered "a great political
wrong," he confessed impotence. Id. at 488. The Fifteenth Amendment notwithstanding, he maintained
that the Court has "liffle practical power" to rectify that wrong. Id. For more on Giles, see Richard H.
Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMErN. 295 (2000).
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not engaged in speech suppression but is addressing an important harm.266
Having conceded that cross burnings cause a distinctive type of harm-"for the
very reasons we've explored this morning,"267 which means on the basis of
Justice Thomas's testimony-the Court could not resist the allure of Justice
O'Connor's question: Why can't the state regulate it?268
C. THE CONTOURS OF EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY
That Justice Thomas's epistemic authority is determinative in Black-that it
affects the outcome-does not mean that it is determinative with respect to all
issues involving race. In fact, Black is exceptional in part because it is one of
Justice Thomas's few wins in this area.269 Some noteworthy losses include the
recent Grutter v. Bollinger, challenging the University of Michigan Law School's
affirmative action program;270 United States v. Fordice, addressing Mississip-
pi's segregated state university system;271 Missouri v. Jenkins, a school desegre-
gation case;272 and City of Chicago v. Morales, which addressed the
constitutionality of Chicago's anti-loitering ordinance.273
However, one should not conclude that because Justice Thomas's opinion on
racial matters does not command deference across the board, epistemic author-
ity was not a background dispute in any of those cases. It was. The fact that one
may defer to the epistemic authority of someone in regard to one subject matter
does not necessarily mean that one defers to her on all subject matters. Ascertain-
ing the contexts, domains, or subject matters that command epistemic deference
is part of the inquiry into epistemic authority.274
Consider Korematsu v. United States,275 the Japanese internment case, as one
unrecognized example of a controversial appeal to epistemic authority. In
Korematsu, the Supreme Court upheld the internment of Japanese Americans
against a constitutional challenge, concluding that the order upon which the
internment was based was not "beyond the war power of Congress and the
Executive .... s276 The Court cited the need to defer to the greater expertise of
military authorities as the primary justification for its decision.277 "The military
authorities, charged with the primary responsibility of defending our shores,"
266. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993).
267. Transcript, supra note 25 1, at 31.
268. Id.
269. One could probably count Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 676 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring), as a win.
270. 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
271. 505 U.S. 717, 745 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
272. 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas. J., concurring).
273. 527 U.S. 41, 98 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
,.. 274. Id. at 465.
275. 323 U.S. 214 (1944), conviction vacated on writ of coram nobis, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal.
1984).
276. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217.
277. Id. at 218-19.
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the Court stated, "concluded that curfew provided inadequate protection and
ordered exclusion."278 The military not only bears the responsibility for national
defense, but it is also in the best position to assess risks.279 Thus, the Court
explains:
[WJe cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and
of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose
number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained. We
cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have
ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be
isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national
defense and safety 2.0
Korematsu has been roundly criticized precisely because of the Court's decision
to defer to the supposed greater expertise of the military. 281
As Korematsu demonstrates, epistemic authority is often part, though fre-
quently an unacknowledged part, of the discussion. However, Korematsu is
deeply unsatisfying not simply because of the Court's decision, but also because
of the Court's failure to address some important questions raised by its appeal to
epistemic authority. 282 When should the Court defer to the assertion of epis-
temic authority? What standards should the Court use in evaluating the merits
of epistemic claims? Contrast the more helpful approach of Justice Jackson,
dissenting in Korematsu.283
Justice Jackson advanced two arguments. First, he noted that the Court is not
284positioned to examine epistemic claims by military authorities. There are
278. Id. at 218.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., Reggie Oh & Frank Wu, The Evolution of Race in the Law: The Supreme Court
Moves From Approving Internment of Japanese Americans to Disapproving Affirmative Action for
African Americans, 1 MIcH. J. RACE & L. 165, 169 (1996).
282. See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 242, 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
283. Justice Murphy's dissent is also instructive on the question of epistemic authority. Unlike the
majority and Justice Jackson, Justice Murphy took issue with the factual assertions of the military
officials and provided a framework for evaluating the military's assertion of epistemic deference. First,
Justice Murphy argued that the factual bases for the internment are based "upon questionable racial and
sociological grounds not ordinarily within the realm of expert military judgment." 323 U.S. at 236-37.
Because military officers made decisions on grounds that were not within their area of expertise, the
officers are not epistemic authorities with respect to those decisions. Consequently, those decisions are
"not entitled to the great weight ordinarily given the judgments based upon strictiy military consider-
ations." Id. at 240. Second, the Court does not owe the military complete deference even when military
officials are operating in areas within their military expertise. The Court's role is to determine whether
military action "is reasonably related to a public danger that is so immediate, imminent, and impending
as not to admit of delay and not to permit the intervention of ordinary constitutional processes to
alleviate the danger." Id. at 234 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 235 (stating that
military action must have "some reasonable relation to the removal of.the dangers of invasion, sabotage
and espionage").
284. See id. at 245.
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contexts in which the Court operates at an epistemic disadvantage-Justice
Jackson used the term "limitation"-war is one of those contexts.285 There are
certain facts that military officials know and that courts do not and cannot know.
Moreover, courts rarely are capable of evaluating the reasonableness of military
action. That is, courts cannot determine confidently that the facts as they are
believed to exist by the military official do not so exist.286 I will characterize
this claim as the realization that epistemic authority is context-dependent.
Justice Jackson wrote:
In the very nature of things, military decisions are not susceptible of intelli-
gent judicial appraisal. They do not pretend to rest on evidence, but are made
on information that often would not be admissible and on assumptions that
could not be proved. Information in support of an order could not be disclosed
to courts without danger that it would reach the enemy. Neither can courts act
on communications made in confidence. Hence courts can never have any real
alternative to accepting the mere declaration of the authority that issued the
order that it was reasonably necessary from a military viewpoint.287
On this score, Justice Jackson essentially agreed with the majority that one
cannot second-guess military leaders in times of war. One must take their
assertions as fact. But here the similarities end. Justice Jackson advanced a
second argument. He suggested that although the Court was compelled to
accept the military's factual assertions that internment was necessary, that
acceptance did not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that the internment was
constitutional.288 Epistemic deference did not extend to determination of the
constitutional question.
From this perspective, epistemic authority is institution-dependent. The mili-
tary has a role, to which courts ought to defer.289 But courts also have a role,
285. See id. at 244-45.
286. Justice Jackson maintained:
The limitation under which courts always will labor in examining the necessity for a military
order are illustrated by this case. How does the Court know that these orders have a
reasonable basis in necessity? No evidence whatever on that subject has been taken by this or
any other court. There is sharp controversy as to the credibility of the DeWitt report [the
military report upon which the military order is based]. So the Court, having no real evidence
before it, has no choice but to accept General DeWitt's own unsworn, self-serving statement,
untested by any cross-examination, that what he did was reasonable. And thus it will always
be when courts try to look into the reasonableness of a military order.
Id. at 245.
287. Id.
.288. Id. at 244 ("And it is said that if the military commander had reasonable military grounds for
promulgating the orders, they are constitutional and become law, and the Court is required to enforce
them. There are several reasons why I cannot subscribe to this doctrine."):
289. See id. ('The armed services must protect a society, not merely its Constitution. The very
essence of the military job is to marshal physical force, to remove every obstacle to its effectiveness, to
give it every strategic advantage.").
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and in fulfilling their task, they ought not defer to any other institution. The
constitutional question is strictly a matter for judicial determination.290
Consider also the recent Grutter case. Part of the dispute in Grutter was
whether the law school's assertion that diversity is a necessary part of its
educational mission constitutes a compelling state interest. How should the
Court have evaluated the law school's assertion that diversity is an integral part
of its educational mission? Compare the following approaches.
In her opinion for the Court, Justice O'Connor stated that the law school's
"educational judgment that ... diversity is essential to its educational mission is
one to which we defer.",29 ' Why? First and perhaps most importantly, because
the law school said so and we "presumefl" that the good administrators at the
University of Michigan act on "good faith absent a showing to the contrary."292
This explanation is a classic account of epistemic authority: We defer to people
who know more than we do-because of their institutional, professional, or
experiential expertise-unless we have reason to believe that they do not know
better. Second, the law school amassed an impressive array of witnesses who
testified to that effect at trial and whose views were made part of the record for
the Court to consider.293 Third, a phalanx of law schools, universities, educa-
tional establishments, scholars, and educators participated as amici in the case
and chanted the same refrain.294 In addition, high-ranking retired officers and
civilian leaders of the United States military testified to the importance of racial
diversity.295 Lastly, major American businesses have made clear that the skills
needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can be developed only
through exposure to "widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints., 29 6
Again, these are classic claims of epistemic authority-our military depends
upon a diverse racial pool. Who are we to question them? In view of the nature,
quality, and breadth of the authorities advancing the same claim before the
Court, what is the Court to do?
Similarly, note that Justice O'Connor herself benefited from a brush with
diversity. By her own account, Justice Marshall "profoundly influence[d]" her
because he brought "a special perspective" to the Court.297 One cannot help but
think about the Michigan cases when Justice O'Connor explains that Justice
Marshall taught her and her colleagues that "the law is not an abstract concept
290. See id. at 247 ("I should hold that a civil court cannot be made to enforce an order which
violates constitutional limitations even if it is a reasonable exercise of military authority. The courts can
exercise only the judicial power, can apply only law, and must abide by the Constitution, or they cease
to be civil courts and become instruments of military policy.").
291. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
292. Id. at329.
293. See id. at 330 (noting the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial).
294. See id.
295. Id. at 331.
296. Id. at 330.
297. Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REv.
1217, 1217 (1992).
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removed from the society it serves, and that judges, as safeguarders of the
Constitution, must constantly strive to narrow the gap between the ideal of
equal justice and the reality of social inequality." 298
Consider Justice O'Connor's opinion in contrast to Justice Thomas's ap-
proach in Grutter. On this score, Justice Thomas advanced two arguments.
First, Justice Thomas argued that if Michigan really was interested in diversity,
it would lower its academic standards and admit a diverse student body.299
Michigan's refusal to explore that strategy suggested that it was not really
interested in diversity.300 Second, Justice Thomas maintained that to the extent
that educational benefits flow from racial diversity, Michigan was using race to
subsidize its educational quality, suggesting again that the law school was not
really interested in diversity. Instead the law school was using "racial discrimina-
tion as a tool to advance [its] interest in offering a marginally superior education
while maintaining itself as an elite institution.",30 ' Thus, for Justice Thomas, the
question is whether Michigan has a compelling interest in using race so that it
may maintain its status as an elite law school.302 The answer, of course, is that
elite status is not a compelling reason for racial classifications.
Note that while Justice Thomas decried the "unprecedented deference to the
Law School-a deference antithetical to strict scrutiny,"303 he too is handi-
capped by the law school's assertion. After all, is Justice Thomas better posi-
tioned than the administrators at the law school to ascertain whether educational
benefits flow from a diverse student body?304 Further, how does one refute the
law school's epistemic claim? Although Justice Thomas gestures weakly in the
direction of social science evidence that contradicts the law school's asser-
tion,305 he does not push the point very far. What is a Justice to do when the
"cognoscenti" are impressively arrayed against him? 306
In a different vein, what should one make of Justice O'Connor's refusal to
defer to the black city council members in City of Richmond v. Croson30 7 in
comparison with her willingness to defer to the white administrators in Grutter?
In Croson, the City of Richmond adopted a set-aside plan that required contrac-
tors who did business with the City to subcontract no less than 30% of the
298. Id. at 1218.
299. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 355-56 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
300. See id.
301. Id. at356.
302. Id. at 356-60.
303. Id. at 362.
304. He did use the Internet to find empirical support for his point that Boalt Hall is doing just fine
in the wake of Proposition 209, which barred California state universities from using race as a factor in
admissions, id. at 367, and that "the Law School trains few Michigan residents and overwhelmingly
serves students who, as lawyers, leave the State of Michigan," id. at 359-60.
305. See id. at 364 (noting "the growing evidence that racial (and other sorts) of heterogeneity
actually impairs learning among black students").
306. See id. at 350 ("The majority upholds the Law School's racial discrimination not by interpret-
ing the people's Constitution, but by responding to a faddish slogan of the cognoscenti.").
307. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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contract to at least one "Minority Business Enterprise."308 At the time, 50% of
the City's residents were Black309 and five of the nine city council members
were Black.310 The City concluded that the set-aside plan was necessary to
remedy discrimination in the construction industry. The Court disagreed.
What is it that accounts for the Court's failure to defer to the Richmond city
council as it did to the University of Michigan Law School? Is this an instance
of epistemic authority as context-dependent? 31" Is this an instance of epistemic
authority as institution-dependent?3"2 Was it the failure to produce sufficient
factual findings in Croson that made Justice O'Connor an epistemic skeptic? 313
Was it the worry over racial self-dealing? 314 Would she have been more
deferential if whites instead of blacks held five of the nine seats on the city
council?315 Do we trust the claims of white citizens more than we trust those of
citizens of color?316 One wonders if that is what Justice Thomas means when he
stated in Grutter that the "majority grants deference to the Law School's
'assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits.' It follows,
therefore, that an [Historically Black College's] assessment that racial homoge-
neity will yield educational benefits would similarly be given deference."3 '7
Why then are Justice Thomas's views in Black more credible than in other
racial contexts? In other words, why might his fellow Justices find his views
more worthy of belief in Black than in other cases?
The Court defers to Justice Thomas on factual and experiential questions
dealing with race when the Court believes that he represents the views of
citizens of color. Compare here Black and Grutter. Black turns almost exclu-
sively upon a very specific, descriptive, racial, and experiential question: is
cross burning invariably intimidating? This is a question about which Justice
Thomas claims and ostensibly possesses superior knowledge; he is at an
epistemic advantage. The nature of Justice Thomas's participation in this case is
that of an insider (person of color) explaining to outsiders (white colleagues)
308. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78. "Minority Business Enterprise" is defined by the plan as
"'[c]itizens of the United States who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or
Aleuts." Id. at 478.
309. Id. at479.
310. Id. at 495.
311. In Grutter the context was education and in Croson contracting.
312. In Croson, the Court intimated that it owed greater deference to congressional findings than to
findings by state and local officials. Id. at 490. But see Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995).
313. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
314. See id. at 493 (expressing concern with "simple racial politics").
315. See id. at 495 (noting that "[f]ive of the nine seats of the city council are held by blacks.").
What does this tell us anyway about Justice O'Connor's conception of race and representation? Cf
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1993) (O'Connor, J.) (maintaining that race-based districting
"reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy by
signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their constituency
as a whole").
316. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. RaV. 1709 (1993).
317. 539 U.S. at365.
618 [Vol. 93:575
COLORED SPEECH
what cross-burning means from the perspective of an insider.
Moreover, when Justice Thomas speaks in Black, in a very important and
poignant way, he speaks on behalf of victims or potential victims of cross
burnings, who are disproportionately people of color.318 Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, his views in Black are consistent with those of other elites of color. In
Black, race is the salient characteristic, the primary explanatory variable. Justice
Thomas's voice is not simply the voice of a conservative, but that of a black
conservative and of a black nationalist.319 Not surprisingly, both ideologies,
black conservatism and black nationalism, have deep historical roots within
black political thought320 and permeate Justice Thomas's opinions.
3 21 Thus,
Justice Thomas's theory of the relationship between cross-burning statutes and
the constitution reflects a widely shared viewpoint among black elites. Indeed,
his approach to the constitutionality of cross-burning statutes in Black, espe-
cially the connection that he draws between white supremacy and cross burning,
is fully consistent with the antisubordination principle as propounded by critical
race theorists and legal academic elites of color.322
Justice Thomas's opinion in Grutter is similar to his opinion in Black in some
respects. As in Black, in Grutter Justice Thomas attempts to explain the
meaning of a racialized event from the perspective of an insider. He opens his
dissent in Grutter with a quotation from Frederick Douglass's speech, "What
the Black Man Wants." Douglass wrote:
[I]n regard to the colored people, there is always more that is benevolent, I
perceive, than just, manifested towards us. What I, ask for the negro is not
benevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice. The American people
have always been anxious to know what whey shall do with us ... . I have
318. See Donald P. Green & Andrew Rich, White Supremacist Activity and Crossburnings in North
Carolina, 14 J. QUANT. CRIM. 263, 267 (reporting results of cross-burning incidents in North Carolina
for 1987-1993).
319. Black nationalism is "based on the contention that understanding the plight of blacks and
achieving black salvation must be based on taking race and racial oppression as the central feature of
modern world history." MIcHAEL DAWSON, BLACK VIsIoNs: ThE RooTs oF CoNTEMPoRARY AFRIcAN-
AMERICAN PoLmcAL IDEOLOGiES 86 (2001).
320. Id. at 19-23.
321. Mark Tushnet, Clarence Thomas's Black Nationalism, 47 How. L.J. 323 (2004).
322. MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WoRDs THAT WOUND: CRImcAL RACE THEORY, AssAuLTIVE SPEECH, AND
TmE FIRST AMENDMENT 15, 136 (1993) (arguing that the First Amendment reflects an antisubordination
principle); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.YU. L.
REV. 1003, 1007-08 (1986) (explaining that the antisubordination principle "seeks to elininate the
power disparities between men anid women, and between whites and non-whites, through the develop-
rnent of laws and policies that directly redress those disparities. From an anti-subordination perspective,
both facially differentiating and facially neutral policies are invidious only if they perpetuate racial or
sexual hierarchy.").
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had but one answer from the beginning. Do nothing with us! Your doing with
us has already played mischief with us. Do nothing with us!323
"What the Black Man Wants," Justice Thomas explains (to his white audi-
ence?), is to be left alone from the patronizing meddling of well-meaning white
social engineers. 324 Moreover, the "benighted notions"3 25 that underlie affirma-
tive action programs are harmful to its supposed beneficiaries. "The Law School
tantalizes unprepared students with the promise of a University of Michigan
degree and all of the opportunities that it offers. These overmatched students
take the bait, only to find that they cannot succeed in the cauldron of competi-
tion."326
Perhaps more importantly, affirmative action stigmatizes both low-achieving
and high-achieving African-Americans. Affirmative action programs are harm-
ful to persons of color because they "'stamp minorities with a badge of
inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude
that they are 'entitled' to preferences."' 3 27 The programs also stigmatize high-
achieving persons of color because whites assume that all persons of color,
regardless of their merit, are beneficiaries of affirmative action:
The majority of blacks are admitted to the Law School because of discrimina-
tion, and because of this policy all are tarred as undeserving.... When blacks
take positions in the highest places of government, industry, or academia, it is
an open question today whether their skin color played a part in their
advancement. The question itself is the stigma-because either racial discrimi-
nation did play a role, in which case the person may be deemed "otherwise
unqualified," or it did not, in which case asking the question itself unfairly
marks those blacks who would succeed without discrimination.328
These objections to the majority's decision in Grutter are very similar to
323. 539 U.S. at 349 (quoting Frederick Douglass, What the Black Man Wants, Address delivered inBoston, Massachusetts (Jan. 26, 1865), in 4 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERs 59, 68 (John W.Blassingame & John R. McKivigan eds., 1991)).
324. Id. at 350 ("Like Douglass, I believe that blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life
without the meddling of university administrators.").
325. Id. at 371.
326. Id. at 372.
327. Id. (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
328. Id. at 373. This is an interesting point. Justice Thomas's argument is essentially that affirmative
action restricts the liberty of those African-Americans who are not its beneficiaries and diminishes the
value of their accomplishments. These individuals do not have the option of exit. No matter what theydo, they are equally tarred. The point is made eloquently by Professor Marcus Cole, an African-American law professor at Stanford Law School. See Marcus Cole, Eugene Misses the True Racism, thePoint, and an Opportunity (An Open Letter) (on file with author). Professor Cole maintains that "many
of those on the left" subscribe to the "arrogant and utterly racist mind-set" that "successful African-Americans owe their success to Affirmative Action as the but-for cause of their success." ProfessorCole goes on to note:
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those that Justice Thomas advanced in Black. Justice Thomas's objections are
based upon his personal experiences as a person of color. As in Black, he speaks
from an insider's perspective.329 In particular, when Justice Thomas maintains
that whites assume that high-achieving African-Americans attain their positions
only because of race and that this assumption stigmatizes and diminishes the
accomplishments of African-Americans, he is drawing from his own personal
experiences.330 However, in Black, his objections had a wider impact on his
colleagues, in Grutter, less so, if at all. Why is that so?
An important difference between Justice Thomas's opinion in Black and his
opinion in Grutter is the fact that Justice Thomas's views in Grutter are not
representative of the views of elites of color. In Grutter, Justice Thomas speaks
solely from the perspective of a black conservative .33 This perspective is
In the current Affirmative Action environment ... there is nothing that any American of
African descent can do that can separate himself or herself from the unspoken accusation that
he or she is the beneficiary of more than they deserve.
Let me illustrate the point. I am willing to bet that I am the only member of this list who
feels compelled to put his standardized test scores and National Merit award on his CV. Why
do I do this? For those of you who do not know me personally, it is not a matter of
braggadocio. Every September I have to deal with nearly 60 prima donna first year law
students whose first and only (initial) reaction to my skin color is that they have been cheated
out of a "real" Contracts professor, and are stuck with an "Affirmative Action" instructor.
Many of them come around when, as some "gunners" often do, they look up my CV and find
that I have outscored virtually every single one of them on the test around which they have
centered their lives, the LSAT. Others usually come around by mid semester when they have
had an opportunity to compare my teaching to that of their other instructors. If numbers
(standardized test scores and teaching evaluations) could obscure my skin color, my life
would be heavenly.
I recently told a "pro-affirmative action" friend who teaches at the University of Pennsylva-
nia that my dream for my two sons is different than most other Americans. While most other
Americans dream of sending their children off to Harvard, Yale or Stanford, I dream of my
two sons attending the University of California at Berkeley, a school to which only the
objective accouterments of their abilities will gain them access. I am very pessimistic that this
society will ever see past their skin color to actually value and enjoy them for the talents with
which God endowed them, and the character with which I hope to leave them. Instead, I fear
that they, like me, will engage in a year-in, year-out, day-in, day-out, relentless pursuit of
personal liberty, and the respect necessary to exercise it.
329. Essentially, Justice Thomas is saying, "You white folks think you're doing us a favor, but
you're not. Your concern is driven by white guilt. You're patronizing us, you're not doing anything to
help those of us who really need help, and you're treating those of us who do not need help as
second-class citizens."
330. As one commentator remarked, "[o]ne would have to have a completely tin ear not to hear the
reference to high places in government as identifying Justice Thomas himself." Tushnet, supra note
321, at338.
331. See, Tushnet, supra note 321, at 330-31. As Professor Tushnet has remarked, Justice Thomas's
nationalism is at odds with his black conservatism. "Nationalism, though, is precisely the kind of group
identity that Justice Thomas's individualism rejects." Id. One way of reconciling these two positions is
to engage the separatist strand of black nationalism. Black nationalism sometimes encompasses
separatism with a focus on self-help and self-empowerment. DAwSON, supra note 319, at 129-30. As
Dawson explains, "black conservatives are more likely to find allies among black nationalists who
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deeply individualistic. As Professor Dawson has noted:
Key ideological traits [of black conservativism] include reliance on self-help,
an attack on the state as a set of institutions that retard societal progress in
general and black progress in particular, and belief in the antidiscriminatory
aspects of markets, all in the name of service to the black community....
Further, any strategy or policy which diminishes the "honor" of African
Americans by allowing one to hold the perception that blacks are receiving an
underserved benefit is considered both immoral and counterproductive. Fi-
nally, claims that blacks have suffered special oppression and deserve special
consideration are rejected for a number of reasons, including the view that
blacks are one of several groups that have suffered disadvantage and therefore
should receive no special consideration.332
As scholars have demonstrated, black conservatism is not representative of
the views of most African-Americans. 333 In fact, as between black nationalism
and black conservatism, black nationalism holds a much greater sway over the
imagination of most African-Americans than does black conservatism. 334 If
Justice Thomas's claim to epistemic authority is based upon the insight he
provides into the impact of the Court's decision on communities of color, it is
not implausible to believe that Justice Thomas's epistemic authority would ebb
and flow depending upon whether his views are likely to be those of the people
for whom he speaks. Black and Grutter suggest that Justice Thomas's epistemic
authority is context-dependent. His credibility depends, at least in part, upon
whether his views are regarded as representative of the views of citizens of
color. When Justice Thomas represents the views of a majority of citizens of
color, as in Black, his epistemic authority is determinative. When his views are
those of a distinct numerical minority, he commands less epistemic defer-
ence. 335
resolutely reject the West and its ideological products than among adherents of other ideologies who
share a common enlightenment heritage with black conservatives." Id. at 282.
332. DAwsoN, supra note 319, at 19-20.
333. See, e.g., id. at 281. ("Black conservatives are the most visible black ideologues in mainstream(white) American media and cultural outlets, but they have little mass support. Not only are their major
policy positions on race and economics rejected, black conservative candidates are routinely shunned at
the polls.").
334. DAWSON, supra note 319, at 83. Dawson's findings on this issue are quite remarkable. He notes
very strong support among African-Americans for black nationalism and extremely weak support for,
indeed strong opposition to, black conservatism. Id.
335. One cannot help but note the irony here. While Justice Thomas decries the use of race as a basis
for credibility and maintains that racial considerations in the division of societal goods are inconsistent
with merit-based evaluation, he does use race and racial iconography to enhance the legitimacy of his
claims and to leverage his credibility. Adrienne D. Davis & Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legacy of
Doubt: Treatment of Sex and Race in the Hill-Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1367, 1391 (1992)(noting that at his confirmation hearings "Justice Thomas played the race card, a card he had
proclaimed was not in his deck."); see also DAwsoN, supra note 319, at 281-82; Tushnet, supra note
321, passim.
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This epistemic account of Justice Thomas's role in Black raises a number of
interesting issues. First, how are we to understand the limitations of Justice
Thomas's epistemic authority? Put differently, is the Court deferring to Justice
Thomas or is the Court deferring to elites of color? Relatedly, if it is true that
the Court defers to Justice Thomas when the Court perceives that his views
coincide with those of elites of color, would the same data that allow us to reach
this conclusion render Justice Thomas's own views superfluous? What matters
is Justice Thomas's ability to claim epistemic authority. When Justice Thomas
speaks on behalf of a united community of color, his claim to epistemic
authority is strengthened.336
Further, the difference between Justice Thomas and elites of color is that
Justice Thomas's position on the Court makes it difficult for his colleagues to
ignore his claim to epistemic authority. Moreover, the costs of not deferring to
Justice Thomas are greater when his views are representative of elites of color.
That is, his fellow Justices would have to contradict Justice Thomas's account,
which would be difficult to do, or would have to contemptuously ignore him.
One can provide a cynical as well as a less-cynical account of the limitations
to Justice Thomas's epistemic authority. Cynically, one could argue that Justice
Thomas serves as a convenient pass-through for white conservative ideologues.
Thus, when President George H.W. Bush nominated then-Judge Thomas to the
Court, many court-watchers concluded that the President was using Judge
Thomas to advance a conservative agenda.337 Similarly, some commentators
have accused Justice Thomas of being subservient to the intellectual agenda of
Justice Scalia.338
This point is not limited to Justice Thomas. Many commentators discredit
336. Compare the actualities of the case and the Court's decision with two hypothetical scenarios.
Assume in both hypotheticals that the Court's ideological predisposition remains constant. In the first,
an all-white Supreme Court considers and decides Black. Assume in this hypothetical that African-
American elites overwhelmingly would prefer a reversal of the Virginia Supreme Court. In the 
second
hypothetical the current Court considers and decides Black but African-American elites are divided on
meaning of cross burning. A minority shares Justice Thomas's views but a majority considers cross
burning hate speech that is annoying but not seriously intimidating. When the African-American
community is divided, Justice Thomas's claim on the meaning of a racialized event is empirically
undermined. Thus, his claim to epistemic authority is correspondingly weakened.
337. See generally John 0. Calmore, Airing Dirty Laundry: Disputes Among Privileged Blacks-
From Clarence Thomas to "The Law School Five," 46 How. L.J. 175 (2003); see also Richard L. Berke,
Judge Thomas Faces Bruising Battle With Liberals Over Stand on Rights, N.Y TIMEs, July 4, 1991, at
A12; Maureen Dowd, Conservative Black Judge, Clarence Thomas, Is Named to Marshall's Court
Seat, N.Y. TIEns, July 2, 1991, at Al; Steven A. Holmes, N.A.A.C.P. and Top Labor Unite to Oppose
Thomas, N.Y. TIEms, Aug. 1, 1991, at Al; Ruth Marcus, Thomas's Conservatism Displayed in Speeches,
Writings, WASH. POST, July 3, 1991, at A15; E.R. Shipp, Feminists Oppose Nominee To Court, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 6, 1991, atA7.
338. E.g. Calmore, supra note 337, at 180-81 ("In 1996, Emerge ('Black America's Newsmaga-
zine') placed Justice Thomas on its cover in caricature as a lawn jockey standing outside of the
,Supreme Court. Within the magazine, there was a depiction of the Justice shining the shoes of Justice
Scalia."); see also Laura A. Ingraham & Stephen F. Smnith, The War Against Clarence Thomas, WASH.
POST, Nov. 6, 1994, at C2 (describing frequent criticism that Justice Thomas is simply a "clone" of
Justice Scalia).
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conservatives of color, in particular black conservatives, by arguing that conser-
vatives of color are stooges for white conservatives.339 These arguments deny
agency to conservatives of color, and often reek of racism, even when they are
being advanced by left-of-center commentators of color. In any event, whether
or not these types of arguments have any merit in other contexts, they are
certainly not applicable to Justice Thomas in Black.340
Less cynically, Justice Thomas's ability to persuade might be limited to
Justices who share, more or less, his ideological predispositions.341 If so, it is
not surprising that Justice Thomas's participation in Black affected the Court's
most conservative Justices. In particular, Justice Thomas appeared to have the
most effect on Justice Scalia.
One must wonder, if one were to substitute Justice Marshall for Justice
Thomas, whether Justice Marshall would have had the same effect. Professor
Tushnet provides evidence that Justice Marshall did not have a similar effect on
other Justices. 342 Even though Justice Marshall attempted to use his epistemic
authority during his tenure on the Court in the same manner as Justice Thomas
did in Black,3 43 Professor Tushnet notes that Justice Marshall was not extremely
successful. 344 For the majority of Justice Marshall's time on the Court, he was
one of the most liberal members on a Court that became increasingly conserva-
tive.345 Thus, while many members of the Court testified, as did Justice White,
that Justice Marshall "would tell us things that we knew but would rather forget;
and he told us much that we did not know due to the limitations of our
339. Take a recent speech by NAACP president Kweisi Mfume to that organization at its annual
convention. Mr. Mfume stated, "When the ultraconservative right-wing attacker has run out of attack
strategy, he goes and gets someone that looks like you and me to continue the attacks .... And like the
ventriloquists' dummies, they sit there in the puppet master's voice, but we can see whose lips are
moving, and we can hear his money talk." Steve Miller, Mfume Calls Black Conservatives Puppets,
WASH. TwEs, July 13, 2004, at A3, available at http://www.washtimes.com/national/20040712-103848-
4561r.htm. In return, a prominent black conservative continued to add to the elevated intellectual tenor
of this debate by accusing the NAACP of being a stooge organization for "liberal white organizations."
Id.; see also Calmore, supra note 337, at 207-08; Christopher Hitchens, Minority Report, NATION, Nov.
4, 1991, at 542; Barbara Ransby and Cheryl I. Harris, Uncle Tom's Cabinet? A Few Black Faces at the
Top Won't Quell the Outrage at the Bottom, IN THESE TIMES, Jan. 22, 2001, at 16; James Strong, Black
Conservationism: 12 Years Of Failure, NEW Prrr. COURIER, Mar. 3, 1993, at A6.
340. Two observations support this conclusion. First, Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent when
he could have joined in the majority opinion or simply joined in Justice Scalia's opinion. Second,
Justice Thomas would have decided this case differently than the other eight Justices. His framework is
significantly broader than the majority's and that articulated by Justice Scalia. For example, he would
have upheld the conviction of Barry Black, the Ku Klux Klan leader, which no one else would have
upheld. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 400 (2003) (Thomas. J., dissenting).
341. I am grateful to Mark Tushnet for helping me to understand this point.
342. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CoNsTIrruToNAL LAw: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT
1961-1991, at57 (1997).
343. Id. at 5 ("Marshall saw his role as educating not only the public but his judicial colleagues as
well, because their experiences were more limited than his."); see also id. at 7 ("Marshall was
particularly alert in reminding his colleagues about issues of race.").
344. Id. at 57, 67.
345. Id. at 57.
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experience,,346 the "conservative Court on which he served listened and then
pretty much went on with its business."347
In contrast, as Professor Tushnet explains, Justice Marshall was influential in
the early years of his tenure on the Court, which coincided with the heyday of
the Warren Court. In particular, Professor Tushnet explains how the Court came
to adopt a doctrinal approach suggested by Justice Marshall, which eventually
became the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.348 Justice Marshall also experi-
enced some important wins in the latter stages of his career. "Marshall's role in
prodding the Court to pay attention to the constitutional law regarding race
culminated in his successful campaign to overturn Swain v. Alabama,"
3 4 9 a
decision in which the Court had concluded that race-based peremptory chal-
lenges did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.350 In Batson v. Kentucky,
35
'
the Court overturned Swain. Though Justice Marshall did not succeed in getting
the Court to adopt his more expansive framework-recall Justice Thomas in
352
Black-he was responsible for the outcome.
Thus, while the epistemic authority account has its limitations, it is important
that students of the Supreme Court come to terms with the concept's impact on
the process of judicial decision-making.3"
Second, the epistemnic account casts doubt upon claims, often made on the
left, that Justice Thomas's jurisprudence is racially insensitive. As this Article
illustrates, Justice Thomas's jurisprudence is deeply preoccupied with the rela-
tionship between law and race. In fact, if critical race theorists are defined as
those who are concerned with the manner in which "a regime of white su-
premacy and its subordination of people of color have been created and
maintained in America"354 and who have a desire to change the existing power
346. Id. at 5 (quoting Justice White).
347. Id. at 67.
348. Id. at 6-7.
349. Id. at 64.
350. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
351. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
352. TUSHNET, supra note 342, at 65-67.
353. An interesting question here is whether the interpretations of Holocaust survivors of the
meaning of Nazi regalia ought to be given epistemic deference in the same way that we might grant
epistemic deference to the interpretations of cross burning by African Americans. See, e.g., Collin v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). I think the analysis will be similar to the analysis in Black. As
with African Americans and cross burning, the epistemic claims of Holocaust survivors ought to be
given deference and should be accommodated. The accommodation would be similar to the Court's
accommodation in Black. Nazis ought to be permitted to march in full regalia in a town's main street or
square. But they should not be permitted to, for example, target a street in which a large number of
Holocaust survivors reside for such a parade. In other words, Nazis ought to have the same access to the
public square as cross burners. But beyond that, they should not be permitted to specifically target their
messages of intimidation to the groups who would most clearly understand the message and would be
most clearly intimidated.
354. CRmcAL RAcE THEORY: THE KEY WRITNGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii (CRENSHAW ET AL.,
eds., 1995).
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relationship between law and race, Justice Thomas is a critical race theorist.355
In other words, if critical race theory is the "creat[ion] of oppositionist accounts
of race," Justice Thomas's dissent in Black and his participation in the case is
critical race theory. Granted, it is not critical race theory in its orthodox form,
and it is certainly conservative, but in Black it is critical race theory.
This observation raises the possibility that progressive scholars of color, in
particular, may have neglected to observe areas of commonality with a justice
who has been universally vilified by the academic left. It is possible, in certain
issues involving race, that Justice Thomas and left-of-center scholars of color
may find common ground if they look for it. It is also possible-concededly not
probable, but nevertheless possible-that if Justice Thomas is engaged by what
he calls "constructive" and "scholarly criticism," 356 scholars of color might
succeed in influencing his opinion on issues of mutual concern. Indeed, if one
takes Justice Thomas at his words-that he finds "thoughtful, analytical criti-
cism most helpful" from "outside scholarship" as opposed to "personalize[d],"
"bilious and venomous assaults"3 5 7-he would be open to such engagement.
For example, both Justice Thomas and progressive scholars of color have
expressed frustration with the manner in which the public education system has
failed African-American children. Some progressive scholars of color, such as
Derrick Bell, have argued that the judicial emphasis on integration spawned by
Brown v. Board of Education is one source of this failure.358 One wonders
whether they could construct a mutually acceptable jurisprudence to address if
not resolve this problem.
Third, my account of Justice Thomas's participation in this case also casts
doubts on the agenda of conservatives of color who would deny the useful
power of race-consciousness and the manner in which a focus on race-
consciousness advances the goal of racial justice.359 Ironically, Justice Tho-
mas's epistemic authority derives from his race and his racial experiences. 360
Justice Thomas's questions during oral argument in Black were a brilliant use of
epistemic authority based upon race.36 ' Without actually saying so, he chal-
355. Id.
356. Justice Clarence Thomas, Speech to the National Bar Association (July 28, 1998) (transcript
available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?documentprint=507) (on file with au-
thor).
357. Id.
358. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT CovENANTs: BROWN v. BoARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED
HoPEs FOR RAcIA.L REFORM 160-179 (2004); see also GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT:
THE SuPREmE COURT AND MINORrnES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 113-16 (1993).
359. See, e.g., SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEw VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA(1990).
360. Recall here Justice Thomas's famous statement in his speech to the National Bar Association,
supra note 356: "I am a man, a black man, an American. And my history is not unlike that of many
blacks from the deep South. And in many ways it is not that much different from that of many other
Americans."
361. For similar examples of epistemic authority based upon racial experiences by Justice Thurgood
Marshall, see TUsHNET, supra note 342, at 8.
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lenged the epistemic account of all parties involved-his colleagues as well as
the attorneys-on the meaning of cross-burning. After all, who is going to
question the Court's lone Black member, and a conservative no less, on the
meaning of cross-burning? Moreover, how would one go about refuting Justice
Thomas's epistemic account?
Thus far, we have ignored a broader and perhaps more difficult question:
what role ought personal or even professional experience play in the adjudica-
tive process? Ought we defer to Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg on gender
issues? Ought we defer to Justice Breyer on issues involving administrative law
or Justice Ginsburg on civil procedure because of their acknowledged expertise
in those areas? Should the Court ever defer to the epistemic authority of one of
its members, especially when that authority is based upon personal experience?
These are indeed complicated issues.
On one view, we have an epistemic account of adjudication that is incompat-
ible with epistemic deference granted on the basis of a judge's personal and
professional experiences. We have an adversary system where parties are
responsible for presenting their sides of the issues and getting their sides on the
record. We have a trier of fact, whose responsibility is to find the facts. We also
defer to the trier of fact. Thus, every first-year law student knows that in the
federal courts the reviewing court must affirm a jury's decision unless there is
no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find as the jury
found; and that a judge's finding of fact is reviewed for clear error. Our
epistemic account of adjudication indicates that judges ought to decide cases on
the basis of the facts as they are on the record and on the basis of "the law."
However, notice how much this epistemic account of adjudication sounds
like the now disfavored sociological jurisprudence of old. But if we learned
anything at all from legal realism, critical legal studies, critical race theory, and
feminist critical theory, it is that concepts such as "law" and "fact" are highly
contested, unstable, political, and indeterminate.
One need not be a crit to recognize that personal testimonies, while they
cannot be central to the adjudicative process, are useful at the margins. We have
already encountered Justice O'Connor's tribute to the importance and impact to
his colleagues of Justice Marshall's "special perspective." Justice Powell also
stated that "a member of a previously excluded group can bring insights to the
Court that the rest of its members lack."362 At least one commentator has noted
that the "participation of women and minorities on the bench may add a
dimension of justice to the courts." 363
Thus, on another view, some questions of constitutional law cannot be
understood and justly resolved apart from personal experience. Determining
-362. BARBARA A. PERRY, A "REPRESENTATIVE" SUPREME COURT? THE IMPACT OF RACE, RELIGION, AN
GENDER ONAPPOuNTMENTs 137 (1991).
363, Sheldon Goldman, Federal Judicial Recruitmnent, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESS-
MENT 189, 205 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991).
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whether having a cross burned on one's yard is threatening requires either
personal experience or the willingness to defer to someone else's epistemic
account.
In any case, Justice Thomas's role in Black is difficult to ignore. Whether one
approves of it at least depends upon whether one believes that Black is a better
case-better, for example, than R.A.YV-because of Justice Thomas's active
participation.
D. THE TRruMPH OF THE CRITS?
While Black is notable for its outcome, its doctrinal divergence from R.A. V,
and the role that Justice Thomas played in the case, it is equally remarkable as a
judicial exercise in critical race theory. From the perspective of critical race
theory, Virginia v. Black is significant in a number of respects, three of which
are worth addressing here. Critical race theorists have argued that cross-burning
legislation, and hate speech legislation more generally, should be understood
within the historical context from which they arise. 364 Second, they have argued
that the Court should use the historical context to frame its doctrinal analysis.365
Lastly, they have argued that First Amendment doctrine is sufficiently capacious
to protect speech and accommodate legislation targeting cross burnings.366 Each
of those perspectives is reflected in the majority opinion in Black.
First, as critical race theorists suggested, the Court used history to define,
contextualize, and cabin the constitutional harm. Justice O'Connor's analysis
begins with an overview of the history of cross burning in the United States.
This historical overview provides five lessons. First, cross burning in the United
States is uniquely associated with the Ku Klux Klan.367 Second, cross burning
is a harbinger of impending violence and is usually followed by violence. 368
Third, a critical purpose of cross burning is intimidation.369 Fourth, cross
burning need not be followed by violence to be intimidating; the burning cross
itself draws upon the historical well of past violence and suffices as an impor-
364. Thus, Mari Matsuda and Charles Lawrence, for example, wrote approvingly of the Minnesota
Supreme Court's original decision, subsequently overturned in R.A.V., to uphold St. Paul's cross-
burning statute: "The Minnesota judges ... adopted a perspective urged by critical race theorists. They
looked to the history and context to understand the effect of cross burning." Matsuda & Lawrence,
supra note 214, at 134.
365. Id. at 135 ("Judges from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harry Blackmun have not had to be radicals
to recognize the simple truth that doing justice requires more than manipulating doctrine in a
vacuum.").
366. See Matsuda, supra note 213, at 2356-62.
367. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 352 (2003) ("Burning a cross in the United States,is
inextricably intertwined with the history of the Ku Klux Klan.").
368. See id. at 354 ("[C]ross burnings have been used to communicate both threats of violence and
messages of shared ideology.").
369. See id. ("Often, the Klan used cross burnings as a tool of intimidation and a threat of impending
violence.").
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tant warning of what may follow.370 Fifth, this history has contemporary
significance. Modern-day cross burners continue to engage in the practice, in
part, to intimidate others.37 ' Moreover, they are capable of intimidating their
victims because of this collective shared history that continues to retain its
salience. 72
The Court's historical overview culminated in the conclusion that "cross
burning is often intimidating, intended to create a pervasive fear in victims that
they are a target of violence." 373 This conclusion on the historical and contempo-
rary meaning of cross burning stands in sharp contrast to R.A.Y In R.A.Y,
Justice Scalia failed to explicitly discuss the harm caused by cross burnings.
374
In fact, Justice Scalia reserved only a single sentence, toward the end of his
opinion, in which he observed, "burning a cross in someone's front yard is
reprehensible."375
Moreover, Justice Scalia in R.A. V is inconsistent with Justice Scalia in Black.
Contrast Justice Scalia's characterization of cross burning as "reprehensible" in
R.A. V, with the following statement in an exchange with Dean Rodney Smolla,
who represented the respondents in Black before the Supreme Court, during oral
argument in the case:
[Dean] Smolla: If I see a burning cross, my stomach may churn. I may feel a
sense of loathing, disgust, a vague sense of . .. being intimidated.
Question: How about a cross-how about a cross -
[Dean] Smolla: But that's not fear of bodily harm.
Question: How about a cross on your lawn?
[Justice Scalia]: Yes. I dare say that you would rather see a man with
a-with a rifle on your front lawn-If you were a black man at night, you'd
rather see a man with a rifle than see a burning cross on your front lawn.
[Dean] Smolla: Your Honor, I concede that.376
Note that Dean Smolla's position-that a burning cross may make one's
stomach churn or may induce feelings of loathing or disgust-is quite consistent
with Justice Scalia's position in R.A. V that a burning cross is reprehensible. But
there is a vast difference between cross burning as a reprehensible act-
370. Id. at 355 ("[C]ross burnings embodied threats to people whom the Klan deemed antithetical to
its goals. And these threats had special force given the long history of Klan violence.").
371. Id. at 357.
372. In fact, one may argue that this history permits cross burners to intimidate with greater
efficiency while at the same time reducing the cost of intimidation to themselves. Cross burners,
whether they are associated with the Klan or not, may free ride on the history of cross burning in order
to communicate a credible threat of violence without incurring greater costs in the form of punishment
for bodily harm and actual violence. Thus, they can achieve virtually the same effect at lower cost or
risk to themselves.
373. Id. at360.
374. See Matsuda & Lawrence, supra note 214, at 134-35.
375. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992).
376. Transcript, supra note 251, at 30.
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presumably worthy of constitutional protection, Dean Smolla's point and Justice
Scalia's position in R.A.V-and cross burning as an act of imminent intimida-
tion, an act of violence-presumably unworthy of constitutional protection and
Justice Scalia's position in Black.377
Second, the Black majority used the historical overview to frame the ensuing
doctrinal analysis. Threats and acts of intimidation are proscribable under the
First Amendment. Cross burning committed with the intent to intimidate an
individual or a group of persons is a type of threat. Consequently, cross
burnings can be proscribed consistent with the First Amendment. The result of
this doctrinal move is the revival of the true threat doctrine. Specifically, cross
burnings are a type of true threat "where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals." 378 Once again, the Court's analy-
sis stands in sharp contrast to R.A.YV, which concluded, "St. Paul has sufficient
means at its disposal to prevent [cross burnings] without adding the First
Amendment to the fire." 379
Third, the Court's analysis in Black supports the assertion of critical race
theorists that current First Amendment doctrine is compatible with narrowly
tailored cross-burning legislation. "The protections afforded by the First Amend-
ment," Justice O'Connor stated in Black, "are not absolute." 380 Victims of cross
burning need not suffer such vile acts in the name of the First Amendment.
To truly appreciate the relationship between Black and critical race theory
(and the nature of this relativist-non-absolutist-First Amendment), one mustjoin the separate observations of two important theorists. The first observation is
the contention of Professor Frederick Schauer that the
boundaries of the First Amendment, far more than the doctrine lying within
those boundaries, turn out to be a function of a complex and seemingly
serendipitous array of factors that cannot be (or at least have not been)
reduced to or explained by legal doctrine or by the background philosophical
ideas and ideals of the First Amendment.381
As he has explained, "the boundary between the speech that implicates the
First Amendment and the speech that does not is as much a matter of history,
sociology, culture, and politics, as it is a matter of formal constitutional doctrine
377. I cannot help but note that I do not know whether other black men (or black women) would
rather see a (presumably white) man on their lawn at night with a rifle than a burning cross. But I do
know that while this black man would prefer neither, if I must choose, I would take the burning cross.
To the extent that the burning cross is a harbinger of things to come, the rifle is the real event.
378. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
379. R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 396.
380. Black 538 U.S. at 358.
381. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1765, 1768 (2004).
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or philosophical free speech theory."382 From this observation Professor Schauer
concluded that it may also be the case that "less of the First Amendment can be
explained by the tools of legal analysis than we have formerly recognized."383
For the second observation we turn to Professor Don Herzog. Professor
Herzog argues that controversies over epistemic authority are deeply politi-
cal.384 Politics, he maintains, is the "realm of controversy over legitimate
authority."385 These are not controversies that can be solved by appeal to
"reason" because such appeal is itself political.386 In other words, what counts
as a valid reason is a contested contextual dispute.
When one combines the insights of Professors Schauer and Herzog, one is
better able to appreciate the complex manner in which critical race theory
interacts with Black. At bottom, critical race theory is a political claim about
law and legal authority. For critical race theorists, appeals to legal authority are
political. That is, these appeals cannot be understood as objective, reasonable
appeals to logic or legal doctrine. They are sociological, cultural, political,
economic, and racial. That they are so does not make them any less legitimate-
legitimacy arguments are context-specific-but simply help us better under-
stand areas of contestation and the nature of our disputes.
Disputes over legal authority tell us about who matters in our society.38 ' They
tell us about whose injury counts as harm.388 Legal doctrine, in this case the
First Amendment, is part of the rhetoric.389 Doctrine masks these disputes and
cloaks their political resolution.
What critical race theory and epistemic authority help explain is how the First
Amendment, which formerly could not countenance cross-burning statutes, has
become less absolute in its scope.390 Seen from the lens of critical race theory,
Black represents at least a partial triumph.391 Whereas R.A.YV appears to be a
complete repudiation of the approach to hate speech advocated by the crits,
382. Schauer, supra note 161, at 348.
383. Schauer, supra note 381, at 1768.
384. HERZOG, supra note 259, at 155-60.
385. Herzog, supra note 260, at 465.
386. HERZOG, supra note 259, at 156 ("For reason is itself the name of a series of political
disputes.").
387. See Virginia v. Black, 536 U.S. 343, 398 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (accusing the plurality
of caring more about the "innocent cross-burner" than the victims of cross burnings).
388. Consider in this vein Justice Thomas's brilliant move in Black where he asks why abortion
protesters did not have a First Amendment right to harass individuals entering abortion clinics but cross
burners had a First Amendment right to intimidate their victims. Id. at 399-400.
389. See Schauer, supra note 381, at 1794 (stating that "the First Amendment's magnetism leads
strategic actors to embrace it as easily as politicians embrace motherhood, the flag, and apple pie").
390. Though Professor Schauer's arguments are limited to the scope of the First Amendment and not
to its contents, see Schauer, supra note 381, at 1769-74, and though legal doctrine explains a great deal
of the First Amendment's content, understanding the political nature of legal disputes in cases such as
Black helps us to explain cases that are otherwise hard on the basis of legal doctrine alone.
391. The triumph is partial if only because in Black the Court is careful to protect the First
Amendment rights of the white supremacist. The white supremacist goes free while the ostensibly
non-racist troublemakers may still be convicted.
2005] 631
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
Black seems to embrace it, at least in part. Black is a vindication of the critical
race theorists and of critical race theory.392 The Black majority utilizes the tools
of analysis recommended by critical race theorists to understand the harm
caused by cross burnings and to determine how First Amendment doctrine
should respond to cross burnings.
CONCLUSION
Black is best understood as representing a fundamental doctrinal shift with
respect to cross burning. As I have argued in this Article, in R.A.Y the Court
demonstrated a marked insouciance about the harm caused by cross burning and
the state's effort to address that harm. Black is a much more nuanced approach
to understanding the relationship between cross burning and free expression.
Whereas R.A.YV erected an absolute prohibition on statutes singling out cross
burnings for regulation, Black attempted to accommodate the state's effort to
protect its citizens from the true threat posed by certain types of cross burnings.
This distinctive type of racial violence is now relevant to the Court's doctrinal
posture in First Amendment cases. Thus, Black represents a fundamental shift in
the Court's doctrinal approach.
To best appreciate this shift, one must focus on Justice Thomas's unique
participatory role in Black. As an African American, Justice Thomas displayed a
remarkable sensitivity to the harm caused by cross burning. Justice Thomas's
influence, demonstrating the power of epistemic authority and epistemic defer-
ence, has in turn provided the crits with an important victory.
392. But this triumph is ironic. It is the Court's conservatives who deliver this intellectual bounty.
Indeed, the Justice who most approximately represents the critical race position on this issue is Justice
Thomas, followed closely by none other than Justice Scalia.
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